Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles by Glancy, Dorothy J.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 52 | Number 4 Article 3
12-14-2012
Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles
Dorothy J. Glancy
Santa Clara University School of Law, dglancy@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1171
GLANCY FINAL 11/15/2012 8:46 PM 
 
1171 
PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Dorothy J. Glancy* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 
I.  Types of Autonomous Vehicles 
A. Selfcontained Autonomous Vehicles Contrasted 
with Interconnected Autonomous Vehicles 
B. Privacy Comparison 
C. Outliers 
II.  Autonomous Vehicle Users 
III.  Privacy Interests 
  A.  Personal Autonomy Privacy Interests 
  B.  Personal Information Privacy Interests 
 1.  Autonomous Vehicle Personal Information 
 2.  Personal Information Regulation 
 3.  Personal Information Privacy Risks 
  C.  Surveillance Privacy Interests 
 1.  Targeted Surveillance 
 2.  Mass Surveillance 
IV.  Expectations of Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles 
A. Public Roadway Privacy Expectations 
B. Vehicle Exceptions to Fourth Amendment 
Warrant Requirements  




If people were not involved with autonomous vehicles, 
privacy would not be an issue.  Because people will be 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Santa Clara University Law School.  B.A. Wellesley 
College, J.D. Harvard Law School.  This Article was presented at the January 
20, 2012 symposium on “Legal Implications of Autonomous Vehicles.”  The 
intrepid autonomous vehicle symposium editors, Tijana Martinovic and Kevin 
Rogan, deserve great credit both for suggesting this topic and for their 
remarkable follow-through.  Many thanks to Barbara Wendling for helpful 
guidance about automobile technology and transportation policy.  Greatly 
appreciated research assistance was provided by Nicole Hess. 
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intended users and purchasers of autonomous vehicles, 
understanding where and how privacy and autonomous 
vehicles will interact is important to the success of these new 
modes of personal mobility.  Whenever a person is linked with 
an autonomous vehicle, privacy interests become important.  
Among the social and cultural issues that may be “the most 
slippery territory for autonomous vehicles,”1 the most 
challenging are privacy interests. 
 Privacy norms center on the unique dignity of each 
individual human person.  They are expressed in several 
types of privacy interests that will affect, and be affected by, 
autonomous vehicles.  For example, autonomous vehicles will 
affect individual autonomy by taking control over an 
important aspect of people’s lives—the way in which they 
move from place to place.  Autonomous vehicles are also likely 
to raise concerns about personal information privacy when 
autonomous vehicles generate personal information about the 
people who use them.  Potential use of autonomous vehicles 
as tools for comprehensively tracking people’s travels affects 
privacy interests associated with concerns about surveillance.  
In the future, autonomous vehicles will need to accommodate 
such privacy interests, just as privacy interests are likely to 
adapt to autonomous vehicles.  This Article explores these 
synergies. 
 Two factors complicate thinking about interactions 
between autonomous vehicles and privacy.  First, interactions 
between autonomous vehicles and privacy are not now a 
presently observable phenomenon.  Not yet marketed as 
consumer products, autonomous vehicles exist at present only 
in a variety of prototypes and experimental models.  
Therefore, it is necessary to project privacy issues onto a 
future world in which autonomous vehicles without active 
drivers move people and goods across roads and highways.  
Second, interactions between privacy and autonomous 
vehicles involve relationships between two flexible concepts 
that can be difficult to pin down.  Precise details of what 
consumer versions of autonomous vehicles will be like are not 
 
 1. Tom Vanderbilt, Let the Robot Drive: The Autonomous Car of the Future 
Is Here, WIRED MAGAZINE, Feb. 23, 2012, available at 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2012/01/ff_autonomouscars. 
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now known.2  Experimental versions discussed in this Article 
suggest a broad range of possible configurations.  Just about 
the only characteristic that all autonomous vehicles appear to 
share is the dispensability of an active human driver.  
Moreover, privacy is a notoriously contentious concept with a 
number of different and evolving meanings.  As a result, 
exploring potential interactions between privacy and self-
driving vehicles (neither of which has a fixed meaning) is 
intellectually challenging. 
This exploration of privacy in autonomous vehicles 
begins by contrasting two potential types of autonomous 
vehicles that, if developed into consumer products, would 
interact with privacy in different ways.  It will then look at 
some of the different types of potential autonomous vehicle 
users.  Next, the Article examines three types of privacy 
interests likely to be affected by autonomous vehicles: 
autonomy privacy interests, personal information privacy 
interests, and surveillance privacy interests.  After 
considering the reasonableness of expectations of privacy in 
the context of autonomous vehicles, this discussion will turn 
to some suggested strategies for optimizing potential 
synergies between privacy and autonomous vehicles. 
I. TYPES OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Interactions between privacy and autonomous vehicles 
will depend on the design and operation of autonomous 
vehicles.  A wide range of possible types of autonomous 
vehicles will apply different technologies to operate motor 
vehicles in different ways.3  All of them replace human 
drivers with artificial intelligence, but do so in different ways.  
 Because privacy is concerned with individual people, this 
discussion focuses on personal vehicles that, if not 
autonomous, would require human drivers to make personal 
 
 2. Autonomous vehicles are more than just self-moving, or self-propelled, 
vehicles.  Self-propelled movement is what the word “automobile” connotes.  
Rather, an autonomous vehicle is operated and controlled by systems of 
artificial intelligence either inside or outside the vehicle or a combination of 
internal and external control.  Autonomous vehicles, which may also be called 
“driverless” or “self-driving” vehicles,  can take many physical forms and may be 
powered by any type of engine—electric, internal combustion, hydrogen, etc. 
 3. See Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 1145, 1146–49 (2012). 
GLANCY FINAL 11/15/2012  8:46 PM 
1174 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
journeys on public roads.4  The potential universe of 
autonomous vehicles would include trucks, buses, taxis, 
emergency vehicles, and the like.5  However, personal 
autonomous vehicles used by people who have privacy 
interests are the most interesting in considering privacy 
issues. 
From a privacy perspective, it can matter a great deal 
how a vehicle’s artificial intelligence interacts with the 
vehicle user and the roadway environment, as well as what 
data the vehicle sends or receives.  When artificial 
intelligence replaces the driver in a driverless car, the 
vehicle’s autonomous systems will rely on a number of data 
sources to assess the driving environment and to control the 
operation of the vehicle.  In thinking about privacy, there are 
considerable differences between two general types of 
autonomous vehicles.  This discussion refers to them as, on 
the one hand, selfcontained autonomous vehicles and, on the 
other hand, interdependent autonomous vehicles.  These are 
simply models of groups of characteristics that future 
autonomous vehicles may have.  They are not technical 
categories, but rather theoretical examples that help in 
thinking about the interactions between privacy and 
autonomous vehicles.  It is likely that future autonomous 
vehicles will combine features of both of these models. 
Three technological factors distinguish between these two 
versions of autonomous vehicles and shape the interactions 
between autonomous vehicles and privacy: (1) where the 
controlling artificial intelligence is located, (2) how external 
data, such as information about the roadway around the 
vehicle, is collected and transmitted to the vehicle and (3) 
whether internal vehicle data is transmitted beyond the 
vehicle.  As will be explained more fully below, selfcontained 
autonomous vehicles deal with these factors differently  
 
 4. Personal vehicles are typically privately-owned or leased passenger cars, 
fleet-owned passenger vehicles, or certain types of individually operated 
commercial vehicles that are ordinarily operated by human drivers on public 
roadways. 
 5. Autonomous mass transit vehicles such as public trolleys, light rail, or 
heavy rail streetcars already exist and pose separate privacy and security 
challenges for their users.  Also not within the ambit of this discussion are 
vehicles that do not regularly operate on public roadways; such as military 
transports, mining vehicles, off-road vehicles, or farm tractors. 
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from interdependent autonomous vehicles.   
All types of autonomous vehicles apply artificial 
intelligence to integrate both internal data from within the 
vehicle and external data about the environment outside the 
vehicle.  Then the vehicle’s analytic processes determine how 
the vehicle behaves (speed, direction, braking, etc.).  Most 
experimental autonomous vehicles locate most of that 
artificial intelligence within the vehicle itself.  That is why 
autonomous personal vehicles are sometimes referred to as 
“self-driving cars.”  But it is also possible for all or part of the 
intelligence controlling an interconnected autonomous vehicle 
to be located outside the vehicle and communicated to the 
interconnected vehicle over a wireless vehicular network.  
The selfcontained autonomous vehicle does not connect to 
such a network and therefore is not subject to external 
control. 
Both the selfcontained and the interdependent 
autonomous vehicles will rely on internally facing sensors 
that collect and feed data about how a vehicle and its various 
parts are operating to a central sensing and diagnostic 
component that analyzes vehicle data from various parts of 
the vehicle.  Most non-autonomous modern vehicles already 
contain such sensors.  According to a writer in the IEEE 
Spectrum, even in 2009 it took “dozens of microprocessors 
running 100 million lines of code to get a premium car out of 
the driveway.”6
 
 6. R. N. Charette, This Car Runs on Code, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 2009), 
available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/advanced-cars/this-car-runs-on-
code/0.  By comparison, it takes 6.5 million lines of software code to operate the 
avionics and onboard support systems of a Boeing 787 Dreamliner.  Id. 
  Consumers may be aware of these sensors 
because some of them provide information to an Event Data 
Recorder associated with air bag systems in most vehicles.  
Internal sensors can also collect continuous data about 
vehicle status that is potentially useful to vehicle 
manufacturers, traffic engineers, insurance companies, and 
the like.  When this vehicle status and operation information 
is associated with an identifiable individual, the data 
becomes personal information that is important for privacy 
purposes.  When a vehicle records such internal sensor data, 
for example through data logging, it is recording personal 
information about an identifiable vehicle user’s location and 
GLANCY FINAL 11/15/2012  8:46 PM 
1176 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
behavior.  Some vehicle data may be anonymous.  However, 
absent privacy precautions, much of a vehicle’s internal 
sensor data is potentially linkable to the vehicle user and is 
therefore personal information that raises privacy issues. 
External situational information about what is going on 
around the vehicle, such as what else is on, or potentially on, 
the roadway is also necessary for autonomous vehicles to 
operate.  The selfcontained model of autonomous vehicles 
exclusively uses onboard outward-facing sensors (such as 
cameras, radar, thermal imaging devices, and LIDAR (light 
detection and ranging) to collect data about the roadway 
environment outside the vehicle.  Typically, it matches this 
external information to digital maps within the vehicle.  In 
contrast, the interconnected model of autonomous vehicles is 
characterized by receiving external roadway situational 
information through wireless communications networks.  The 
connected vehicle systems currently under development are 
designed to transmit data about the sending vehicle’s internal 
status (exact location, speed, heading, and the like) as well as 
about general roadway, traffic, and weather conditions in the 
vicinity to other nearby autonomous vehicles.  Navigational 
guidance and travel information may also be carried over 
vehicular networks. 
Interconnected autonomous vehicles are characterized by 
participating in such a vehicular network over which they 
both send and receive data.  Selfcontained autonomous 
vehicles do not participate in the network at all and therefore 
retain within the vehicle all of its internal and external data, 
as well as full control over the operation of the vehicle.  
Although separated for the purpose of this discussion into two 
distinct autonomous vehicle models, future autonomous 
vehicles may well combine features of both models. 
A. Selfcontained Autonomous Vehicles Contrasted with 
 Interconnected Autonomous Vehicles 
Selfcontained autonomous vehicles are defined by their 
reliance solely on information generated from onboard the 
vehicle, which provides data regarding both internal vehicle 
operations and the external environment.  These vehicles 
typically also have internal maps of the roadways to be 
traversed.  A selfcontained autonomous vehicle will generate, 
collect, and retain a great deal of information about the 
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vehicle, its operation, and the status of its user.  That 
information remains entirely inside the selfcontained vehicle 
unless or until the information is removed.  The selfcontained 
autonomous vehicle is not connected to any vehicular 
network, is not subject to external control, does not rely on 
off-board sources of information, and does not communicate 
vehicle-related data beyond the vehicle itself.  This is the 
general configuration of the experimental Google car.7 
In contrast, interconnected autonomous vehicles are 
wirelessly connected to a communications network, or 
possibly multiple communications networks.  Such a vehicle 
could potentially be controlled through the network, either 
directly through operational commands sent to the vehicle or 
indirectly through selective communication of information 
known to cause the vehicle to behave in a particular way.  For 
interconnected vehicles, the network provides situational 
information communicated by external sources of information 
about the immediate roadway environment through which 
the vehicle is passing.  Information transmitted to an 
interconnected autonomous vehicle may include status 
messages from other vehicles or persons that share the 
network, as well as GPS location data, traffic, and weather 
reports.  The interconnected autonomous vehicle also 
automatically transmits its own internal vehicle status data 
through the network to nearby vehicles or to other network 
users. 
 The United States Department of Transportation 
(USDOT) is developing this type of vehicular network in its 
Connected Vehicle Program.8  Connected vehicles receive over 
a wireless channel information about the roadway 
 
 7. Erico Guizzo, How Google’s Self-Driving Car Works, IEEE SPECTRUM,  
http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/artificial-intelligence/how-google-
self-driving-car-works (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  The Google Car apparently 
uses GPS for basic location data, but does not entirely rely on GPS in 
determining vehicle location. 
 8. The Interconnected version of autonomous vehicles would use 
technologies under development in the Connected Vehicle research program.   
Connected Vehicle Research, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE 
TECH. ADMIN., http://www.its.dot.gov/connected_vehicle/connected_vehicle.htm 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration is currently studying the application of this Connected Vehicle 
type of autonomous vehicle.  Stephen P. Wood et. al., The Potential Regulatory 
Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1423, 1426–27, 1429, 1431–34 (2012). 
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environment, including the presence and behavior of other 
road users.  In the Connected Vehicle Program, this network 
is cooperative in that a vehicle both receives and shares 
internal vehicle sensor information (speed, velocity, heading, 
etc.) with other similarly connected, data-sharing vehicles 
through what are called vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communications.9  Assuming that it uses the Connected 
Vehicle systems currently under development, an 
interconnected autonomous vehicle could also communicate 
vehicle status data in real time to roadside infrastructure for 
use by traffic management centers, toll collection agencies, or 
law enforcement through vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) 
communications or to mobile devices (V2D).  Sometimes the 
array of potential recipients of vehicle data is simply 
described as vehicle to “whatever” (V2X).  For some 
communications, such as real-time communications with 
other nearby vehicles, the speed and low latency provided by 
a technology known as dedicated short-range communications 
(DSRC) is likely to be essential.  For other types of 
communications, interconnected autonomous vehicles can use 
various forms of wireless communications, for example, 
telematics systems such as that used in General Motors’ 
OnStar.  If it follows the parameters of the Connected Vehicle 
Program, an interconnected autonomous vehicle might well 
use a mix of information and guidance provided to the vehicle 
over multiple wireless networks. 
B. Privacy Comparison 
These two contrasting models of autonomous vehicles 
have very different privacy implications.  On the one hand, 
the selfcontained autonomous vehicle will generate, analyze, 
and maintain information, including personal information, 
solely within the vehicle itself.  On the other hand, the 
interconnected autonomous vehicle is designed to interact 
continuously with an external network.  This network either 
 
 9. In the USDOT “Connected Vehicle Program,” the Core (or Core System), 
is such an enterprise network for communications among vehicles and between 
vehicles and other elements participating in the Core, such as traffic 
management, navigation applications and many other potential users.  
Connected Vehicle Core System Baseline Documentation, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: 
RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN.,  http://www.its.dot.gov/press/2011/ 
connected_vehicle_coresystem_docs.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
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may simply provide necessary information about the external 
situation for the autonomous vehicle to determine how to 
operate or may directly control the interconnected vehicle’s 
operation. 
Overall, selfcontained autonomous vehicles may seem 
more private than interconnected autonomous vehicles.  That 
is both because selfcontained vehicle guidance does not 
receive information or control messages from external 
sources, and because the selfcontained model does not send 
internal vehicle status information to or through an external 
network.  The fact that information and control remain inside 
the selfcontained vehicle also makes this model seem more 
secure. 
Interconnected autonomous vehicles appear more privacy 
risky because they depend upon vehicular networks that are 
external to the vehicles.  The personal autonomy of users 
would be affected by an interconnected autonomous vehicle’s 
susceptibility to external control.  In fact, an interconnected 
vehicle could be externally controlled in two ways.  First, 
indirect control could be exerted by manipulating information 
transmitted to an autonomous vehicle programmed to behave 
in a predictable way upon receiving such information.  For 
example, the vehicle could be caused to change route by 
sending it data indicating that the road ahead is blocked.  
Second, the network could communicate direct operational 
commands.  For example, a network command could stop a 
vehicle or cause the vehicle to go to destinations not chosen 
by its user.  Were all of the operations of an interconnected 
vehicle’s movements directly controlled by external decision 
makers, the autonomous vehicle itself would appear to be no 
longer autonomous.  Rather it would be under remote control.  
Such an externally controlled vehicle would not be driving 
itself.  Instead, it would be driven by a decisionmaker other 
than the vehicle or its user.  It might be called a “puppet 
vehicle,” because the external decisionmaker would control 
the vehicle as if a puppeteer were pulling the strings of a 
marionette.  In this situation, all personal autonomy of the 
user would be eliminated. 
With regard to personal information privacy, both types 
of autonomous vehicles are likely to have highly detailed 
continuous data regarding vehicle location, as well as 
information about where the user wanted to go, did go, and 
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what the user could have seen along the way.  In 
selfcontained autonomous vehicles, personal information 
would be concentrated on-board the vehicle.  As a result, the 
vehicle itself would be a repository of personal information 
about everywhere its user had traveled, how the vehicle had 
traveled, and everything encountered along the way.  This 
personal information contained within the vehicle would be 
vulnerable to hacking, burglary, and potential access by 
investigators, both private and governmental.  Enhanced 
physical and data security would be essential to protect the 
privacy of personal information in the selfcontained 
autonomous vehicle.  Moreover, measures such as encryption, 
personal data minimization, and frequent data destruction 
would be crucial to protect personal information in 
selfcontained autonomous vehicles.  Real-time surveillance of 
selfcontained autonomous vehicles would be possible through 
outside tracking, but not from within the vehicle itself. 
An interconnected autonomous vehicle presents more 
risks to personal information because interconnected vehicles 
are designed to be engaged in constant network 
communication of such personal information as the user’s 
real-time location.  The vehicular communications network, 
on which the interconnected autonomous vehicle relies, would 
have many more potential data breach points at which 
personal information could be extracted, hacked or might leak 
out.  Any such network would have to provide robust personal 
information protection and network security measures, 
including encryption and anonymization, to guard against 
privacy risks.  Indeed, legislation or regulation may require 
strong network privacy protections for interconnected 
autonomous vehicle communications networks.  The network 
on which interconnected autonomous vehicles would rely 
could also be used for surveillance of every interconnected 
vehicle.  That is why privacy protections and strict controls 
over access to the network will be essential to protect the 
privacy of interconnected autonomous vehicle users. 
Although potential impacts on privacy may seem greater 
in the context of an interconnected autonomous vehicle, those 
potential privacy impacts do not mean that one type of 
autonomous vehicle is necessarily better than another.  It 
simply means that different types and degrees of privacy 
protection will be needed depending on the types of 
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technologies represented by the two models of autonomous 
vehicles discussed here, or whatever combination of 
technologies is eventually built into future autonomous 
vehicles. 
C. Outliers 
One type of autonomous vehicle that has been the object 
of considerable speculation is not yet available even in 
prototype.  That is an autonomous vehicle with its own 
imagination, emotions, and capacity for independent 
judgment.  A vehicle with the ability to make spontaneous 
choices regarding why to travel, when and where to go, and 
how to get there, completely independently of human 
initiation or intervention, exists at present only in fiction.  If 
such a vehicle were developed in the future, it might threaten 
not only the privacy interests discussed here, but also other 
human values.10 
Fictional examples of autonomous vehicles with 
imaginations and emotions, as well as capacities for 
independent judgment, are usually highly 
anthropomorphized, with out-sized personalities and uncanny 
abilities to communicate in human languages or even in 
Morse code.11  These fictional autonomous vehicles can be 
seen in animated films (Cars12) or romantic fantasies (Chitty 
Chitty Bang Bang13 and The Love Bug14) or appear as 
sidekicks in science-fiction settings such as the Knight Rider’s 
smart-talking KITT.15  Stephen King’s menacing Christine in 
the film of the same name is an extreme example.16  Popular 
fiction presents frightening science-fiction versions of 
autonomous vehicles that are smarter than their users as 
terrifying vehicular “Hals” capable of thinking independently 
 
 10. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND 
BIOLOGY 7–9 (2005).  See infra discussion of the Singularity at note 31. 
 11. The menacing trucks in the Stephen King movie, Maximum Overdrive, 
communicated their demands for diesel in Morse code.  MAXIMUM OVERDRIVE 
(De Laurentiis Entertainment Group 1986). 
 12. CARS (Pixar Animation Studios, Walt Disney Pictures Group 2006). 
 13. CHITTY CHITTY BANG BANG (Warfield Productions 1968). 
 14. THE LOVE BUG (Walt Disney Productions 1968). 
 15. KNIGHT RIDER (Universal Media Studios 2008). 
 16. CHRISTINE (Columbia Pictures 1983) (The title character is an 
apparently indistructable 1958 Plymouth Fury consumed by psychotic love for a 
young man.) 
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and contradicting human commands.17  These are not the 
autonomous vehicles discussed in this Article. 
In addition, this discussion does not focus on either 
robotic or platooned vehicles that are sometimes considered 
autonomous vehicles.  Robotic vehicles have been in use for 
some time in public transit or paratransit applications.  They 
are programmed by humans to carry out specific repetitive 
transport between fixed points—for example, transporting 
passengers or cargo to, from, or through highly controlled 
environments, such as dedicated lanes or roadways.  Among 
the oldest of these technologies are guide-rail transit systems 
that have been used for ground transport in and around 
airports and amusement parks for decades.18  Such robotic 
vehicles, pre-programmed by human controllers to operate in 
fixed ways, are not autonomous vehicles for the purpose of 
this discussion. 
Similarly, platooned vehicles are also not the focus of this 
privacy discussion.  Platoons of wirelessly-connected tightly-
spaced vehicles following a lead vehicle19 do not need a driver 
in every vehicle because they are controlled by the vehicle 
leading the group.  Aside from a possible lead vehicle driver, 
who makes all of the decisions for the unit, no active driver 
control of individual vehicles is needed as the group of 
 
 17. Hal was the psychopathic computer in Arthur C. Clarke’s science fiction 
novel 2001: A Space Odyssey that overruled the surviving astronaut, Dave.  “I’m 
sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I can’t do that . . . .”  ARTHUR C. CLARKE, 2001: A SPACE 
ODYSSEY (1968).  Such threats are among the possibilities contemplated by 
those concerned about the singularity, when artificial intelligence becomes 
smarter than human intelligence. 
 18. The Denver Airport provides interesting examples of applications of 
robotic systems.  On the one hand, the automated passenger tram has been a 
big success.  Denver Airport Tram, VISITING D.C., http://www.visitingdc.com/ 
airports/denver-airport-tram.asp (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  On the other 
hand, the automated baggage system remains an infamous example of a robotic 
system that simply did not work.  Kirk Johnson, Denver Airport Saw the Future.  
It Didn’t Work,  N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/27/national/27denver.html?_r=1&pagewanted
=all. 
 19. Trevor Mogg, Ford Boss: The Self-Driving Car Is Essential—and Coming 
Soon, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/ford-
boss-the-self-driving-car-is-essential-and-coming-soon/.  “Between 2017 and 
2025, Ford believes cars will have the technology to reduce the role of the driver 
markedly, and that many automobiles will be at least semi-autonomous” 
through “ ‘ vehicle platooning’ whereby vehicles proceed pretty much bumper to 
bumper through the use of car-mounted sensors.  This will improve safety and 
save space on roads which will by that time be busier than ever.”  Id. 
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vehicles moves as a unit or platoon.  Both before a vehicle 
joins a platoon, as well as after the vehicle has disconnected 
from the platoon, each vehicle is not autonomous and requires 
a human driver.  So long as joining and leaving a platoon is 
entirely voluntary and personal information is not collected or 
mishandled as a result of platooning, there are likely to be 
relatively few privacy issues posed by an unidentified vehicle 
voluntarily and temporarily following other presumably 
unknown vehicles. 
Moreover, vehicles with automated and assistive features 
are not the focus of this discussion of privacy and autonomous 
vehicles.  Already available on conventional motor vehicles, 
such features are attractive to consumers because they 
enhance safety, comfort, and convenience.  At the same time, 
these features remain under the driver’s ultimate control.  
Rather than being autonomous, in the full sense of self-
driving, vehicles with automated or assistive systems remain 
subject to driver decisionmaking and control.  The features 
are driver assisting, rather than driver eliminating.  Even the 
most sophisticated of the currently available assistive 
systems—such as self-parking, automatic lane alignment, 
and adaptive cruise control with automated braking and 
acceleration—provide driver override and can usually be 
turned on or off by the driver.  Motor vehicles can also be 
equipped with automated driver warnings and other 
automated safety functions. 
Many of these automated vehicle technologies are aspects 
of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) now widely 
adopted throughout the United States and elsewhere in the 
world.20  Some of these technologies automate a specific 
function in ways that cannot be performed by a driver.  For 
example, anti-lock brakes pulse a vehicle’s brakes more 
rapidly than would be possible for any human driver.  Some 
of these automated features are required.  For example, in 
addition to anti-lock breaking systems (ABS), Electronic 
Stability Control (ESC) is required for all vehicles built after 
 
 20. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation, 11 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151 (1995) discusses many of these ITS 
automotive technologies that have been on the road for a long time.  For more 
recent description of ITS technologies, see generally, Intelligent Transportation 
Systems, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., 
http://www.its.dot.gov/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
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September 1, 2011 and driven on United States highways.21  
These limited automated features do not make the vehicle 
autonomous since they do not replace overall control by a 
human driver. 
The psychological importance of driver control in our 
culture is typified by James Bond’s famous cars, specially 
engineered by “Q” for Bond’s missions.  James Bond’s cars are 
automated, but not autonomous, vehicles.  Typically, Bond 
vehicles are equipped with elegant and powerful automated 
and assistive systems.  But James himself is always depicted 
as in charge of the vehicle, not vice-versa, even when he is not 
literally occupying the driver’s seat.  Being a super-spy or 
superhero seems to require always being in charge of one’s 
vehicle.22  Passively being driven around by an autonomous 
vehicle just does not fit the active mastery and in-control-at-
all-times superhero image.  The distinction between a driver 
who is actively in control of a vehicle, although supported by 
automated and assistive systems, as opposed to a passive 
passenger controlled by an autonomous vehicle, can be 
significant not only for fictional superheroes, but also for 
privacy as well. 
II. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE USERS 
Although autonomous vehicles will not be for everyone, 
the broad range of potential types of autonomous vehicles is 
matched by an equally varied spectrum of potential 
autonomous vehicle users.  Since the role of a person using an 
autonomous vehicle is typically passive, driving enthusiasts, 
who enjoy driving automobiles for pleasure or for the thrill of 
controlling a powerful machine, may not want to use 
autonomous vehicles.  In contrast, part of the attraction of 
autonomous vehicles is the opportunity for an individual, who 
would otherwise need to be fully engaged in driving, to do 
something else or nothing at all. 
 
 
 21. 49 C.F.R. § 571 (2011) (Standard No. 126: Electronic stability control 
systems.) 
 22. Batman’s “Batmobile” is another example.  See, e.g., THE 1966 TV 
BATMOBILE, http://www.1966batmobile.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2012); THE 
HISTORY OF THE BATMOBILE, http://www.batmobilehistory.com (last visited Apr. 
22, 2012). 
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At least initially, most autonomous vehicle users will be 
licensed drivers.  State legislation allowing autonomous 
vehicles on public roads now typically requires a licensed 
driver who is capable of taking control of an autonomous 
vehicle in an emergency.  For example, Nevada, the first state 
to license an autonomous vehicle for experimental road use 
requires that there be at least two humans in the vehicle and 
that one of them must be licensed and capable of driving the 
vehicle if necessary.23  Moreover, in the short run at least, 
autonomous vehicles will have to share roads and highways 
with human-driven vehicles unless and until there are 
dedicated roadways for autonomous vehicles.24 
Some autonomous vehicle users will likely find a sense of 
security in being kept track of when they travel.  Such a 
“someone is watching over me” message is already a theme in 
advertising for such telematics services as General Motors 
OnStar.25  For some people, being watched over might feel 
comforting.26  However, others would find the same watching 
to be oppressive monitoring by an overbearing agent of social 
control.27  For example, those who object to red light cameras 
reflect this latter attitude of being repelled by indiscriminate 
monitoring.28  Of course, to the extent that being monitored is 
 
 23. NEV. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, LCB File No. R084-11, Adopted 
Regulation of the Department Of Motor Vehicles (2012), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/RegsReviewed/$R084-11_ADOPTED.pdf.  
NEV. DMV REGULATIONS, LCB File No. R084-11, section 10 (Mar. 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter NEV. DMV], available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/register/Regs 
Reviewed/$R084-11_ADOPTED.pdf. 
 24. The near future when there will be a mixture of autonomous and driver-
controlled vehicles, will present substantial challenges in terms of integrating 
autonomous vehicle technology into the existing infrastructure. 
 25. Other examples of similar driver assistance telematics include BMW 
Assist, Ford RESCU, Kia UVO, Lexus Link, Lexus Enform, AcuraLink, Honda 
InterNavi, Mercedes-Benz TeleAid, Nissan CarWings, Toyota Entune, and 
Volvo OnCall.  Embedded Telematics in the Automotive Industry, IHS ISUPPLI 
10–12 (Nov. 22, 2011), http://gallery.mailchimp.com/e68b454409061ef6bb 
1540e01/files/Embedded_Telematics_in_the_Automotive_Industry_sw_iS.pdf 
[hereinafter Embedded Telematics]. 
 26. That is one of the major selling points of communications systems such 
as OnStar.  See, e.g., OnStar, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/onstar.com 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 27. The paradigm of such an agent of social control is Big Brother in George 
Orwell’s novel, 1984.  See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949). 
 28. Nathan Koppel, On Red-Light Cameras and the Constitution, WALL ST. 
J. L. BLOG (Aug. 25, 2011, 5:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/25/on-red-
light-cameras-and-the-constitution/. 
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a matter of informed choice by the person being watched, 
choosing to be monitored could be an exercise of personal 
autonomy. 
For some people, autonomous vehicles could enable more 
autonomy than they now have.  For example, disabled 
persons, the elderly, and those with impaired driving abilities 
may find that an autonomous vehicle is just what they want 
and need.  For these potential users, an autonomous vehicle 
would provide enhanced personal autonomy and self-
determination about when, how, and with whom to travel.  
Autonomous vehicles could provide more individual travel 
choices than they now enjoy, including the otherwise 
unavailable independence of traveling alone.29  Nevertheless, 
for such users there may be a trade-off with privacy.  Being 
linked with an autonomous vehicle is likely to generate a 
great deal of personal information about where the user is 
and what he or she is doing, as well as a comprehensive log of 
places the user visited.  For some potential autonomous 
vehicle users, relying on an autonomous vehicle could pose a 
Hobson’s choice—either to take this autonomous vehicle mode 
of personal transport that tracks your every movement, or to 
have no individual vehicle mobility at all. 
For persons ineligible to drive, including the elderly, 
disabled persons, and perhaps children, there is also the risk 
that future regimes of autonomous vehicles might exercise 
even greater control over individual choices regarding 
whether to travel, where to travel, and when to travel.  For 
example, an interconnected autonomous vehicle subject to 
external control by network commands would be able to 
prioritize roadway use so that disabled persons, or elderly 
persons, or other categories of users might also be required to 
travel before or after rush hours.  In short, disabled or elderly 
persons who care a great deal about their privacy may face 
what seems to be a devil’s bargain: In order to reclaim the 
ability to travel independently through use of an autonomous 
vehicle, a person must compromise privacy by disclosing 
personal information and subjecting herself to external 
 
 29. As noted earlier, state law autonomous vehicle licensing requirements, 
such as those in Nevada (requiring a driverless car to contain at least two 
people, one of whom is licensed to take over driving from the vehicle), could 
make this hope illusory.  See NEV. DMV, supra note 23, at § 10. 
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control.  As a result, some disabled people have suggested 
that, given an autonomous vehicle’s potentially adverse side 
effects, they would rather take the bus. 
III. PRIVACY INTERESTS 
When autonomous vehicles become a common mode of 
personal transport, three types of privacy interests will 
influence public acceptance of autonomous vehicles and 
possibly result in legal restrictions on how autonomous 
vehicles can be designed and operated.  These three types of 
privacy interests are personal autonomy, personal 
information, and surveillance.  Separate sections address 
each of these privacy interests in detail below.  Moreover, the 
extent to which autonomous vehicles present a context in 
which their users reasonably expect privacy is also the 
subject of an extended discussion in a separate section.  The 
moral force of all of these privacy interests, as well as of the 
legal privacy rights associated with them, is based on the 
dignity of people expected to use autonomous vehicles.  These 
privacy interests also articulate important political 
considerations regarding the impact of autonomous vehicles 
on civil liberties and individual freedoms.  All of these facets 
of privacy play vital roles in a well-functioning civil society as 
well as in providing protections for individual liberty.  They 
are features of individualism and human freedom that face off 
against authoritarian dominance or manipulation by 
totalitarian states.  They are also potentially compatible with 
autonomous vehicles. 
Conventional legal analysis of privacy commonly splits 
privacy interests into two branches: autonomy privacy 
interests and information privacy (or data privacy) 
interests.30  However, given the nature of autonomous vehicle 
technologies, it makes sense to discuss separately 
surveillance privacy interests that combine both autonomy 
 
 30. This bifurcation is the approach of the California courts in describing 
the privacy interests protected under the California Constitution’s guarantee of 
an “inalienable right to privacy.”  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (2012).  In Hill v. Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 (1994), the court described information 
privacy as “interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and 
confidential information.”  According to the court, autonomy privacy refers to 
“interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal 
activities without observation, intrusion or interference.”  Id. 
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and personal information interests.  In the context of 
autonomous vehicles, surveillance privacy interests have 
added political and psychological significance.  Each of these 
three types of privacy interests, explored in detail below, will 
affect autonomous vehicles in important ways. 
A. Personal Autonomy Privacy Interests 
Personal autonomy underlies many types of privacy 
rights.  In an era when discussions about privacy often 
emphasize digital personal information and the Internet, this 
may seem surprising.  With regard to autonomous vehicles, 
personal autonomy will be important in decisions whether or 
not to choose an autonomous vehicle in the first place.  
Personal autonomy is concerned with individual control and 
self-determination—people’s abilities to make independent 
choices about themselves.  Many individuals identify 
psychologically with the vehicles they drive and view their 
vehicles as key instruments of personal choice, power, and 
control.  It is uncertain whether this close identification of 
personal autonomy with a person’s vehicle may be different 
with regard to use of autonomous vehicles.  Were autonomous 
vehicles primarily used in car sharing, paratransit, or similar 
applications, rather than in an individual’s personal 
ownership or exclusive use of a specific vehicle, the intensity 
of psychological connection between a personal vehicle and 
autonomy could diminish.  Nevertheless, some association 
between personal mobility and individual autonomy will 
undoubtedly remain. 
In general, personal autonomy privacy interests focus on 
an individual’s ability to control such matters as who knows 
where she is now, where will she go next, when she will 
depart, how she will get there and with whom, as well as who 
can predict or decide where, when, and how she will travel in 
the future.  The idea of autonomous people using autonomous 
vehicles is verbally puzzling, in part because autonomy 
appears twice.  One can imagine a struggle over which 
autonomy will ultimately prevail—the human’s or the 
vehicle’s?31 
 
 31. This discussion of autonomy is concerned with different issues from 
those posed by the Singularity, a future in which artificial intelligence 
surpasses human intelligence and overrides human autonomy.  The Singularity 
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Superficially, autonomy relationships between drivers 
and autonomous vehicles may appear to be relentlessly 
inverse—a zero-sum relationship in which the greater the 
autonomy of the vehicle, the less autonomy is available for 
the driver, or vice-versa.  However, such a view mistakenly 
assumes that autonomy relationships between vehicles and 
users are necessarily binary.  Rather than requiring all or 
nothing control, as used in this context autonomy refers to 
independence with regard to choices and decisions.  So long as 
each autonomous decisionmaker independently chooses a 
decision, it does not matter that numerous other 
decisionmakers arrive at the same decision.  It is also 
important that autonomy can be delegated to agents.  The 
format of such delegations can range from a formal legal 
power of attorney to simply asking someone else to pick up 
unspecified ingredients for dinner at the grocery store. 
As used here, the word “autonomy” is based on an 
ancient Greek concept that combined “auto,” meaning “self,” 
with “nomos,” meaning “law.”  They expressed this idea as 
“autonomia,” a word that literally meant “self-law” and 
signified to the ancient Greeks “giving oneself one’s own 
law.”32  Autonomy was associated with the authenticity of a 
person as the author of that person’s own actions33 as well as 
with a concept of free will that is essential for personal 
 
involves “[s]marter-than-human intelligence, faster-than-human intelligence, 
and self-improving intelligence.”  The Singularity focuses on “technologies 
which, if they reached a threshold level of sophistication, would enable the 
creation of smarter-than-human intelligence.”  What Is the Singularity?, 
SINGULARITY INST. FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://singinst.org/overview/ 
whatisthesingularity/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  In such a scenario 
autonomous vehicles might pose serious existential risk to human beings.  In 
discussing “How could an Intelligence Explosion be useful?,”  Luke 
Muehlhauser discusses how “humanity faces several existential risks in the 
21st century, including global nuclear war, bioweapons, superviruses, and 
more.”  Muehlhauser does not mention autonomous  vehicles.  Luke 
Muehlhauser, SINGULARITY FAQ, SINGULARITY INST. FOR ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, Sec. 3.2, http://singinst.org/singularityfaq (last visited Apr. 22, 
2012).  Nevertheless, if future autonomous vehicles are safer, cleaner, and more 
reliable than any human, the government might prohibit all driver control and 
therby eliminate by regulation a major aspect of human autonomy. 
 32. Autonomia, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (Oxford 
Univ. Press). 
 33. ARISTOTLE, Book II, in NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, at § 4, available at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.2.ii.html (last visited Apr. 24, 
2012). 
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responsibility.  The Stoics and Epicurus are credited with 
shaping the ancient concept of autonomy into something like 
the modern sense of self-determination that remains 
fundamental to personal responsibility.34  Thomas Aquinas35 
and Emanuel Kant36 further explored this ancient notion of 
autonomy in their theories of individual agency and moral 
responsibility. 
Of course, applying autonomy to a non-human vehicle is 
shamelessly anthropomorphic.  That is also true of many 
modern uses of autonomy, such as autonomous republics and 
autonomous under-sea (or Mars) rovers, as well as 
autonomous vehicles.  Autonomy privacy interests, including 
self-determination, choice, and self-control, reflect the older 
individual-centered concept of autonomy as an attribute of a 
person’s moral self. 
As applied to autonomous vehicles, individual autonomy 
contemplates delegation of some choices to the vehicle while 
others are retained by the individual user.  Autonomous 
vehicles can be considered agents, tasked with making 
particular assigned choices or decisions limited to certain 
matters.  For example, the vehicle may control specific 
functions (such as choice of speed or route) but be required to 
follow other choices (such as the destination or when to start) 
made by an individual human user.  In many instances, 
human choices and vehicular choices will turn out to be 
congruent or overlapping. 
A human individual’s choice to use an autonomous 
vehicle is an exercise of individual autonomy.  As a result, 
autonomous vehicle users will almost certainly determine the 
purpose or goal of a journey.  That decision could be followed 
by a choice to “delegate” to the autonomous vehicle aspects of 
how the journey is to be accomplished.  In such a scenario, the 
autonomous vehicle would be seen as subordinate to the user 
as the user’s chosen agent and an instrument of the user’s 
decisions.  An autonomous vehicle could be given the power to 
make the more granular or technical decisions.  After all, 
 
 34. THE ESSENTIAL EPICURUS: LETTERS, PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES, VATICAN 
SAYINGS, AND FRAGMENTS (Eugene O’Connor, trans., Prometheus Books 1993). 
 35. THOMAS AQUINAS, BASIC WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, (A. C. 
Pegis, ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1997). 
 36. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (L. W. Beck, 
trans., Macmillan Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1993). 
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autonomous vehicles are “vehicles”37 used in instrumental 
ways to accomplish transportation tasks chosen and 
ultimately controlled by humans.  In many situations 
involving autonomous vehicles, decisionmaking will be 
blended.  A human user may delegate operational choices to 
vehicle technologies, but retain overall transportation “goals” 
and high-level choices. 
In the context of autonomous vehicles, four aspects of 
autonomy privacy will have special importance: control, 
choice, intrusion protection, and anonymity.  These features 
of personal autonomy also interrelate in interesting ways 
with both personal information and surveillance privacy 
interests that will be discussed below.  Historically, legal 
rights to autonomy have been associated with control over 
intimate personal choices, such as decisions regarding 
contraception38 and abortion.39  Today, autonomy privacy laws 
also require respect for less intimate individual choices.  
When individual choices are compiled into a consumer profile, 
this profile can be used as an unchosen “stand-in” for, or alter 
ego of, an individual.  Indeed, future transactions may treat 
this profile as more real than the actual individual.40  Such 
profiling interferes with choice and compromises autonomy by 
interfering with a person’s self-definition.  Such an autonomy 
privacy right to self-definition is sometimes also the focus of 
privacy tort actions, as well as privacy statutes and 
regulations.41  Moreover, since one’s location partly defines 
one’s identity, the capacity of autonomous vehicles to  
locate users could pose hazards for autonomy privacy by 
influencing users’ decisions about where to go.  Physical and 
psychological intrusions by censors or snoopers can also 
interfere with personal autonomy.42  Being able to drive 
 
 37. The word, “vehicle,” comes from the Latin vehiculum, meaning an 
instrument designed or used to transport people or cargo.  See Vehicle, n., 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 38. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 39. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 40. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Feb. 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/ 
shopping-habits.html. 
 41. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940); Melvin v. 
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285 (1931). 
 42. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (involving the seizure of 
obscene film from a person’s home).  Justice Marshall insisted that the: 
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anonymously is a choice that is part of autonomy privacy.  
Legal protections for this choice to be anonymous include the 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.  This federal statute 
prohibits unpermitted disclosure of driver and vehicle 
licensing records from state departments of motor vehicles to 
identify a person.43 
A functional view of autonomy privacy describes it as 
operating in two ways—positive and negative.44  The positive 
side of autonomy privacy involves a person’s freedom to take 
action and affirmatively to do something, such as make 
choices.  In contrast, negative autonomy privacy involves an 
individual’s freedom from external interferences.  
Autonomous vehicles will affect both types of autonomy 
privacy. 
Positive autonomy refers to an individual’s abilities to 
take autonomous action and to make autonomous choices.  
The famous Warren and Brandeis article that launched 
modern legal concepts of a right to privacy described the 
positive aspect of autonomy in connection with protecting “the 
conduct of a noble life.”45  Positive autonomy includes an 
individual’s ability to control that individual’s own 
personality as well as the ability to make decisions about 
interacting with others,46 to travel or to stay home.47  Over the 
 
Right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social 
worth, is fundamental to our free society . . . . [T]he right to be free, 
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental 
intrusions into a person’s privacy . . . . If the First Amendment means 
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting 
alone in his own house, what books he may read or films he may 
watch.  Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men’s minds.  
Id. at 564–65. 
 43. See Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725 (2012).  The 
statute has a number of exceptions such as for law enforcement uses. 
 44. Modern concepts of autonomy are reflected in the duality of freedom.  
See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958); see also E. GOFFMAN, 
BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 3–12 (1963); E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF 
SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).  See generally Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE 
L.J. 475, 475–82 (1968). 
 45. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193, 207 (1890). 
 46. Id. at 196, 219–20. 
 47. Justice William O. Douglas described various zones of privacy, in which 
an outermost privacy zone protects an individual’s “freedom to walk, stroll, or 
loaf.”  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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last century, court decisions protecting positive autonomy 
privacy often focused on an individual’s rights to control one’s 
own life choices and to make highly personal decisions, 
particularly with regard to intimate matters, such as sex and 
procreation.48  However, much more mundane activities than 
sex and procreation are also facets of positive autonomy 
privacy.  For example, concerns about positive autonomy 
privacy motivate the Federal Trade Commission’s ongoing 
efforts to deal with online behavioral advertising.49  This 
positive side of autonomy privacy also applies to 
transportation choices, including an individual’s right to 
determine where to go, how to get there, and when to travel.50  
In the future, when a person chooses either to drive or to use 
an autonomous vehicle, such a choice will be an exercise of 
positive autonomy. 
The negative side of autonomy privacy was famously 
characterized by Warren and Brandeis as “the right to be let 
alone.”51  Negative autonomy privacy means that an 
individual can prevent access to the individual.  It empowers 
the individual to prevent or avoid external influences, 
interferences, or meddling.52  The resulting state of non-
interference is negative autonomy privacy.  This negative side 
 
 48. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973). 
 49. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL 
DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC 
POLICY FRAMEWORK (2010), available at  http://www.commerce.gov/sites/de 
fault/files/documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-green-paper.pdf; FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326pri 
vacyreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).  See also In the Matter of Google Inc., 
F.T.C. Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011). 
 50. The informal anthem for positive transportation autonomy might be the 
refrain: 
You gotta go where you wanna go, 
Do what you wanna do 
With whoever you wanna do it with. 
JOHN PHILIPS, GO WHERE YOU WANNA GO (Lou Adler 1965).  This song was 
made famous by “The Mamas & the Papas”  on their album “If You Can Believe 
Your Eyes and Ears” from 1966.  THE MAMAS & THE PAPAS, IF YOU CAN 
BELIEVE YOUR EYES AND EARS (Lou Adler 1966). 
 51. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 45, at 195. 
 52. In the original argument for recognizing a right of privacy in the United 
States the principle of “an inviolate personality” was one of Brandeis’s 
descriptions of negative autonomy.  Id. at 205; see also Dorothy J. Glancy, The 
Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 21–28 (1979). 
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of autonomy protects an individual’s positive freedom to make 
independent decisions “without observation, intrusion, or 
interference.”53  Many privacy laws protect individuals 
against unwanted interferences with negative autonomy.  
Examples include statutes that protect people against 
cyberstalking54 and spam.55  Whether autonomous vehicles 
will be instruments that facilitate intrusion or will be 
equipped to prevent intrusion will depend on how 
autonomous vehicles are designed and built.56  For example, 
autonomous vehicle users could be treated as captive 
audiences for location-based targeted advertising as they 
drive from place to place.  On the road, autonomous vehicles 
could also be designed to screen out such unwanted 
interferences.  Safeguarding individual autonomy against 
governmental encroachment is a central purpose of the Bill of 
Rights to the United States Constitution.57 
Legal protections against interferences with autonomy 
privacy in the context of autonomous vehicles are likely to 
focus on several objectives.  These objectives include (1) 
protecting user decisionmaking and control over whether and 
how an autonomous vehicle is used, (2) requiring respect for a 
user’s choice and consent with regard to both vehicle 
operation and information autonomous vehicle travel, and (3) 
preventing intrusions including unwanted sensory inputs, 
such as advertising thrust on an individual using an 
autonomous vehicle. 
 
 53.   Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35 (1994).  
Psychological distress from powerlessness, lack of control over one’s situation is 
said to be among the most severe deprivations associated with incarceration 
and institutionalization. 
 54. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (2011).  
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, at least thirty-four 
states have enacted similar legislation.  National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), State Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment Laws, 
NCSJ.ORG (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom 
/cyberstalking-and-cyberharassment-laws.aspx. 
 55. The CAN-SPAM ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701−7713 (2012). 
 56. In court decisions, negative autonomy privacy rights against intrusion 
have ranged from rights not to be bombarded by unwanted information, e.g. 
Pub. Utilities Comm’n. v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), to physical intrusions 
(such as trespass or physical searches) to capturing personal communications 
and personal information.  Tort law provides for damage actions for intrusion, 
appropriation, public disclosure and for false light.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 158, 217, 223, 652E (1977). 
 57. U.S. CONST.  amends. I−X (2012) 
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Many autonomy privacy issues can be avoided by 
securing individual users’ affirmative choice and consent.  
However, such consent has to be fully informed to be effective.  
Because of the complicated technological nature of 
autonomous vehicles, securing informed individual consent to 
interferences with user autonomy may be difficult.  A major 
challenge for autonomous vehicle developers will be to make 
sophisticated technical information about the consequences of 
using these vehicles understandable by potential users. 
A particularly useful way to avoid autonomy privacy 
problems is through anonymity.  Since people sometimes 
want or need to travel without others knowing when and 
where they are going, anonymity is likely to be an important 
choice required by people considering use of an autonomous 
vehicle.  For interconnected autonomous vehicles, assuring 
anonymity will pose a special challenge.  For example, 
anonymous travel in interconnected autonomous vehicles 
may raise security concerns about being able to trace 
misbehaving technology, or to find antisocial activity or to 
prosecute individuals responsible for unlawful network 
activities.  Nevertheless, as the United States Supreme Court 
recently recognized, the ability to choose anonymous personal 
mobility is important for a society that seeks to avoid 
authoritarianism.58 
B. Personal Information Privacy Interests 
Autonomous vehicles are likely to generate a great deal 
of data.  Some of that data will be personal information 
because it is associated with individual people.  As a result, 
appropriately coping with large amounts of personal 
information will pose major challenges for autonomous 
vehicles.  Potential autonomous vehicle users are likely to be 
reluctant to allow their personal information to be collected or 
used without knowing what will happen to that information 
and what the consequences are for the users themselves.  
Personal information privacy interests related to autonomous 
vehicles would include such matters as where, when, and how 
a person moves from geographical place to place, what uses 
are made of such personal data, why it is being collected, how 
 
 58. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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it will be used, how long it will be kept, and who will and will 
not have access to it. 
The present location of an autonomous vehicle user, that 
person’s past travel patterns and his or her future travel 
plans are among the personal information likely to be 
associated with autonomous vehicles.  Such information can 
be used to annoy an individual user through targeted 
marketing and advertising.  It can also be used to harass an 
individual through following, stopping and questioning her, 
or even stealing her identity.  Stalkers can use this type of 
personal information to frighten or harm people.  Government 
agencies, including law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies, will seek to use personal information from 
autonomous vehicles to find suspicious individuals for further 
investigation or to prosecute suspects based on autonomous 
vehicle data.  Personal information from autonomous vehicles 
about a user’s past locations will also be used to predict where 
the individual is most likely to be found in the future. 
Moreover, personal information from autonomous 
vehicles can be correlated with other information.  For 
example, the location where the vehicle is regularly parked 
overnight (e.g., in a high-income residential neighborhood) 
could be used to profile the likely user (e.g., as wealthy) and 
to predict the user’s actions (e.g., likely to shop at high-end 
retail shops).  The profile could also be used to manipulate 
user choices such as where to travel (e.g., through 
advertisements for expensive resorts) or to eat (e.g., 
enticements to visit a five-star restaurant in the next town).  
Personal information from autonomous vehicles can also be 
used as part of an individual’s data profile that is used as a 
surrogate for the individual person.59
 
 59. Alexis Madrigal described this issue as “the leading edge of a much 
bigger discussion about the relationship between our digital and physical selves 
. . . . [It] may end up determining who you are when viewed by a bank or a 
romantic partner or a retailer who sells shoes.”  Alexis Madrigal, I’m Being 
Followed: How Google—and 104 Other Companies—Are Tracking Me on the 
Web, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/12/02/im-being-followed-how 
-google-and-104-other-companies-are-tracking-me-on-the-web/253758/. The 
European Data Directive, now under revision, treats personal information as a 
sort of alterego of the information’s subject, with important dignitary and 
human-rights-based interests at stake.  Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of 
  At a much larger scale, 
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collection of comprehensive personal information from all 
autonomous vehicles could result in concentration of 
information about and power over large numbers of 
individuals that would pose troublesome political issues. 
The United States Supreme Court has raised 
constitutional concerns about trapping people by secretly 
collecting personal information without the knowledge or 
consent of the people involved.60  Personal data retained 
indefinitely beyond the awareness of the person who is the 
subject of the information is a nightmare scenario.61  In the 
legal realm, aversion to collection and use of personal 
information by unseen data collectors on the Internet has led 
to calls for restrictions on such collection of personal 
information.62  Government officials, at both state and federal 
levels, have suggested legal measures to restrict this type of 
collection of personal information on line.63  On the road, 
covert collection of personal information from autonomous 
vehicles can pose similar problems.  Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized the problem of tracking people on 
the road when it unanimously held that tracking a suspect by 
placing an unseen GPS device on the suspect’s vehicle is 
unconstitutional without a warrant.64  Developers of 
autonomous vehicles are in the fortunate position of being 
aware of these personal information issues in advance, so 
that autonomous vehicles can appropriately minimize 
personal data collection. 
 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, EURLEX (Oct. 24, 1995), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. 
 60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95557 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 96263 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
 61. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL, (Mike Mitchell, trans., Oxford World’s 
Classics  2009). 
 62. Julie Brill, Big Data, Big Issues, FTC.GOV available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120228fordhamlawschool.pdf (last visited Apr. 
24, 2012). 
 63. Id.; THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED 
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION 
IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [hereinafter 
WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT] (last visited Apr. 24, 2012); Press Release, 
Kamala D. Harris, Office of the Attorney Gen. of the State of Cal., Joint 
Statement of Principles with Amazon.com Inc. (Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n2630_signed_agreement.pdf. 
 64. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
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1. Autonomous Vehicle Personal Information 
Autonomous vehicles will produce and use many types of 
personal information, such as origin-destination data and 
real-time location information.  Since autonomous vehicles 
remain experimental, there is no comprehensive catalogue of 
all of the personal information that may be collected by 
autonomous vehicles.  Detailed behavioral data regarding 
users of autonomous vehicles, as well as real-time and 
historic data about an identified autonomous vehicle user’s 
movements in physical space are potential examples.  
Destination decisions of autonomous vehicle users, as well as 
the time, place, and circumstances of when such travel 
decisions are made, reflect the personalities, behavior, and 
personal preferences of the people associated with these 
decisions.  Standards that specify data elements that 
autonomous vehicles will collect, use, record, or transmit have 
not yet been adopted.65  When these standards are adopted, 
personal information requirements, such as requiring that 
information about autonomous vehicle users be anonymous, 
should be part of them.   
Travel patterns of autonomous vehicle users will likely be 
among the most valuable of the personal information 
associated with any type of autonomous vehicle.66  Personal 
information about a user’s present and past locations, 
activities, and frequent destinations are examples.  In the 
selfcontained autonomous vehicle, retrospective information 
related to the user could be logged within the vehicle itself.  
In the interconnected version of autonomous vehicles, this 
type of data would be transmitted more or less continuously 
to and through the network.  As a result, location data would 
be available to pinpoint and keep track of the vehicle user, 
 
 65. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has appointed a committee 
to come up with standards for roadway autonomous vehicles.  But these 
standards are not yet available and do not appear to address personal 
information.  See On-Road Autonomous Vehicle Standards Committee, SAE 
STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT, http://www.sae.org/servlets/works/customer.do (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 66. For example, experimental models of selfcontained autonomous vehicles, 
that rely on the vehicle’s own sensors for roadway data, require that the journey 
be patterned in advance by human drivers.  Such patterning records how the 
vehicle is driven by a human driver along the route to be autonomously driven 
later by the vehicle.  Connected to a user such a pattern is personal information. 
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both in real-time and over time.67   Transmitting this personal 
information through a network, as is the design of 
interconnected autonomous vehicles, would make locating an 
autonomous vehicle user in real time relatively easy for 
anyone with access to the network. 
Once patterns of frequent travel have been recorded 
(either by the network for the interconnected autonomous 
vehicle or within the selfcontained autonomous vehicle), that 
information can be used to reconstruct a person’s past travel 
and to predict the individual’s future destinations.  Mobile 
systems that collect, digitize, and transmit information about 
a person’s present and past locations and travel patterns are 
already criticized as presenting a serious problem for 
personal information privacy.  As a result, they have been 
targeted by lawsuits and regulatory initiatives.68  The sharp 
and negative reaction to physical tracking by mobile devices 
is indicative of how sensitive personal information associated 
with autonomous vehicles is likely to be. 
All sorts of potential data users will be interested in 
autonomous vehicle user information.  In addition to 
autonomous vehicle developers and transportation 
researchers, entities engaged in marketing, advertising, and 
political persuasion, as well as law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, would all find autonomous vehicle user 
data highly valuable.  For example, vehicle miles traveled by 
a person on particular roadways could be collected 
automatically by an autonomous vehicle to provide the basis 
for charging for use of highways as well as to provide 
information about roadway demand and performance to land 
use and transportation planning agencies.  In addition, if 
made available to marketing and advertising agencies, such 
personal data could also be used to advertise local retail 
opportunities or to manipulate autonomous vehicle users’ 
decisions about where to shop.  Political candidates already 
 
 67. Concurring opinions in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), 
addressed this issue at 95556 (Sotomayor, J.) and at 963 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 68. Al Franken, Privacy and Civil Liberties in the Digital Age, WIRED, Mar. 
2, 2012, available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2012/03/opinion-franken-
privacyliberties/; Chris Foresman, Google Faces $50 Million Lawsuit over 
Android Location Tracking, ARS TECHNICA, available at 
http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/04/google-faces-50-million-
lawsuit-over-android-location-tracking (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
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use personal demographics and travel patterns in, for 
example, “commuter issues” campaigns. 
One strategy for avoiding problems associated with 
personal information is to rely on anonymous information 
instead.  For autonomous vehicle purposes, that would 
require separating information about the vehicle itself from 
information linked to an individual person and not collecting 
the latter.  Anonymous information derived from autonomous 
vehicles should be sufficient for such uses as transportation 
planning, traffic management and the like.  The challenge 
will be to maintain the anonymity of this information, which 
often gains value when linked to an identifiable person.  
Unfortunately, there is no permanent, solid divide separating 
anonymous data from personal information.  When linked to 
an individual human person, such as an autonomous vehicle 
user or owner, the vehicle data easily becomes personal 
information.69  Data mining and relational database 
techniques can provide such linkage and re-identify 
seemingly anonymous information as referring to a particular 
identifiable individual.  For example, linking together a 
database of anonymous aggregated information with other 
databases can identify a particular individual or set of 
individuals.70  That is why simply removing identifiers or 
even aggregating de-identified personal information from a 
number of individuals is usually not sufficient to maintain 
anonymity.  Instead, summarizing data so that particular 
data records no longer exist is the best way to assure that 
anonymity continues and that personal information is not 
subject to misuse. 
If personal information is collected about autonomous 
vehicle users, those users deserve an opportunity actively to 
consent or not to consent to such personal data collection.  As 
noted earlier, securing consent from individuals to collection 
 
 69. When autonomous vehicles operating without human drivers are rare, 
the very presence of the autonomous vehicle on the road may be sufficient to 
link it with a very limited category of autonomous vehicle owners.  The vehicle 
make and model, as well as perhaps the location where it is seen would likely 
reveal the owner.  Such linkage to an individual results in what had been 
anonymous information about an autonomous vehicle becoming personal 
information about the autonomous vehicle’s user.  See also NEV. DMV, infra  
note 74, regarding requiring special license plates for autonomous vehicles. 
 70. Brill, supra note 62. 
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or use of personal information derived from autonomous 
vehicles poses a challenging problem because the technologies 
involved in autonomous vehicles are likely to be difficult for 
most potential users to understand.  Nevertheless, whenever 
personal information is collected, used, stored, or shared, 
informed consent from the person involved is likely to be 
required. 
2. Personal Information Regulation 
Personal information, such as that likely to be associated 
with autonomous vehicles, is regulated by an increasing 
number of state and federal statutes and regulations that 
govern collection and use, as well as prohibit misuse of 
personal information.  There are also industry standards 
regarding appropriate practices with regard to personal 
information. 
An example of existing state personal information laws 
that would apply to personal information from autonomous 
vehicles are statutes requiring notification of missing or lost 
personal information—privacy breaches.  Forty-six states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands 
have enacted such legislation that requires notification and 
remedial action if personal information is lost or disclosed 
through a data breach.71  Since the specifics of these data 
breach laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
autonomous vehicles operating in more than one state could 
be subject to privacy breach laws of several different states.  
A number of states, such as Massachusetts, follow their 
residents’ personal information and protect it, wherever the 
data moves geographically.72 
A federal statute regulates one type of personal 
information likely to be associated with autonomous 
vehicles—driver and vehicle licensing information.  The 
 
 71. See Security Breach Legislation 2011, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/ 
telecom/security-breach-legislation-2011.aspx.  Some states also provide 
additional protection with regard to vehicle and driver licensing information 
under state statutes and regulations. 
 72. Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act , MASS. G.L. ch. 93A (2011) and 
201 CMR 17.0117.05 (Massachusetts Standards for the Protection of Personal 
Information of Residents of the Commonwealth) (2012). 
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Drivers’ Privacy Protection Act73 (DPPA) applies nationwide 
to personal information required and processed by state 
departments of motor vehicles for licensing purposes.  The 
DPPA imposes statutory damages for improper use or 
disclosure of personal information provided for the purposes 
of licensing drivers and vehicles.  The statute protects 
specified categories of personal information, such as name 
and address, and provides even more protection for highly 
sensitive personal information, such as race.  So far, the only 
state that registers autonomous vehicles is Nevada, where 
autonomous vehicles will be required to display distinctive 
red or green number plates.74  In addition, Nevada 
regulations require a special driver’s license endorsement for 
“a person who holds a driver’s license in this State and wishes 
to operate an autonomous vehicle in autonomous mode in this 
State.”75 
In addition to federal Constitutional Bill of Rights 
protections against government intrusion discussed below,76 
federal statutes such as the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA)77 and the Federal Communications Act78 
will apply to certain aspects of autonomous vehicle 
communications, particularly in interconnected versions of 
autonomous vehicles.  Moreover, to the extent that federal 
agencies collect or receive information about identifiable 
users of autonomous vehicles, the Privacy Act of 1974 would 
apply.79 
There seems to be a significant potential for legislation 
and regulation that specifically focuses on personal 
information derived from autonomous vehicles.  Such 
legislation is illustrated by experience with what is called 
Event Data Recorder (EDR) statutes.  Beginning almost ten 
years ago, a number of states began to enact legislation to 
restrict access to information recorded by EDRs.80  For 
 
 73. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2012). 
 74. NEV. DMV, supra note 23. 
 75. Id. at § 5.1.  The autonomous vehicle driver’s license requires a “G” 
endorsement. 
 76. U.S. CONST, amends. I–X.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 77. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
 78. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012). 
 79. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). 
 80. By 2010 at least thirteen states had enacted legislation specifying 
specific privacy protections for EDRs.  2009-12 Privacy Legislation Related to 
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example, California Vehicle Code section 9951 applies to any 
new motor vehicle manufactured on or after July 1, 2004 that 
is sold or leased in California and is “equipped with one or 
more recording devices commonly referred to as ‘event data 
recorders (EDR)’ or ‘sensing and diagnostic modules 
(SDM).’ ” 81  Not only must the EDR be disclosed in the owner’s 
manual, access to personal data derived from these devices 
requires either consent by the vehicle’s owner or a court 
order.  The California statute also specifically requires that 
telematics subscription services disclose their capacity to 
record or transmit vehicle diagnostic information as part of 
their subscription services.  Although directed at EDRs and 
SDMs, this statute will directly apply to autonomous vehicles 
insofar as they use recording devices similar to EDRs or 
SDMs.  This statute also may potentially apply to other types 
of vehicle data logging, for example by a selfcontained 
autonomous vehicle. 
In part to provide a modicum of national uniformity, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
promulgated extensive regulations standardizing EDRs and 
EDR data as well as requiring special disclosure language 
regarding EDRs in vehicle owners’ manuals.82  By the time 
autonomous vehicles are rolled out as consumer products, 
there may be changes in the regulatory status of the internal 
vehicle sensor information currently associated with EDRs.  
For example, the United States Department of 
Transportation may decide to standardize internal vehicle 
sensor information and to require that it be transmitted 
through a Connected Vehicle network.  If so, protection of 
personal information transmitted through such a network 
would need to be addressed. 
3. Personal Information Privacy Risks 
Autonomous vehicles can pose a variety of risks to 
personal information privacy.  To the extent that autonomous 
vehicles rely on anonymous information and do not generate 
 
Event Data Recorders (“Black Boxes”) in Vehicles, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/ 
event-data-recorder-quotblack-boxes-quot-legi.aspx. 
 81. CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951(a) (2012). 
 82. 49 C.F.R. §§  563.1–563.12  (2011). 
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or use personal information, they will avoid many of these 
risks.  Simply not having personal information—through 
limiting personal information collection and not retaining 
personal information that has been collected—helps to 
minimize these risks. 
To the extent that autonomous vehicles do generate 
personal information, disclosure or transmission of that 
information to others aggravates privacy risks.  In addition to 
simple loss or improper disclosure of personal data, access to 
personal information through legal process is easier when 
such information is held by someone other than the data 
subject.  For example, constitutional protections do not apply 
to law enforcement and national security officials when they 
seek access to personal information, not from the person, but 
from others who have the personal information.83  Under the 
“Third Party Doctrine,” a readily available subpoena, court 
order, or administrative order, often without notice to the 
data subject, can provide relatively easy access to personal 
data in the hands of someone other than the person who is 
the subject of the personal information.84  No warrant or 
probable cause finding is required.  Because this “Third Party 
Doctrine” circumvents constitutional privacy protection, 
which would otherwise require a judicial warrant for 
government access to the same personal information held by 
the data subject, information privacy risks are magnified.  
Personal information derived from autonomous vehicles also 
would be potentially available to civil litigants and private 
investigators, in such cases as divorce actions and vehicle 
accident litigation.  If personal information is transmitted by 
autonomous vehicles to other persons and entities, encryption 
and data security measures as well as confidentiality 
agreements and requirements will only be partly successful in 
protecting the privacy of autonomous vehicle personal 
information. 
Different types of autonomous vehicles will pose different 
types of risks to personal information.  The two versions of 
 
 83. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979). 
 84. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
561 (2009); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), Misc. Nos. 1:11–DM–3, 10–GJ–3793, 1:11–EC–3, 2011 
WL5508991 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011). 
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autonomous vehicles (selfcontained and interconnected) 
described earlier85 will deal with personal information about 
users in different ways.  In general, more personal 
information will probably be at greater risk in the 
interconnected type of autonomous vehicle than in the 
selfcontained version.86  The fact that interconnected 
autonomous vehicles rely on wireless communications to 
exchange information with other vehicles and network users 
accounts for some of these privacy risks.  Since an 
interconnected vehicle constantly communicates with the 
network for situational information and guidance, a user’s 
locations and decisions regarding destinations and changes in 
route would be automatically and continuously available 
through the network.  Moreover, the device identifiers of 
interconnected autonomous vehicles will likely make all data 
communicated by interconnected autonomous vehicles at 
least potentially personal information, unless the device 
identifiers have been anonomyzed.  Even with anonymous 
device identifiers, any personal information transmitted by 
the vehicle through a communications network could be 
vulnerable to unpermitted access unless the data is encrypted 
and the network is very secure.  As a result, in an 
interconnected autonomous vehicle, personal information 
would need to be robustly anonomyzed, strongly encrypted, 
and securely protected to avoid being vulnerable to access, 
use, and sharing within the network by other network users, 
the network’s controlling entity, or unauthorized 
interlopers.87
In contrast, the selfcontained autonomous vehicle does 
not use wireless communications and is not connected to a 
network.  Instead, the selfcontained autonomous vehicle 
relies on its own outward-facing sensors for information about 
driving conditions and roadway situations.  Such a vehicle 
  In the end, privacy risks to users of 
interconnected autonomous vehicles would largely depend on 
how the network connecting interconnected autonomous 
vehicles is designed, managed, and operated. 
 
 85. See supra Part I.A–B. 
 86. Of course most autonomous vehicles will combine these types of 
artificial intelligence.  However, considering these types as models will help in 
seeing some of the differences autonomous vehicle design makes with regard to 
personal information privacy. 
 87. Wood, et al., supra note 8 at 1462–64. 
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relies on its own inward-facing sensors for internal vehicle-
related data.  As a result, the vehicle itself could become a 
concentrated repository of all sorts of personal information, 
including a user’s travel patterns, highly detailed behavioral 
information, and perhaps the activities of people outside the 
vehicle within range of the vehicle’s sensors.  Although less 
useful for real-time remote tracking of its user, a 
selfcontained autonomous vehicle could nevertheless hold 
retrospective personal information such as highly detailed 
information about its past locations as well as interactions 
between the vehicle and its user.  The privacy risks would 
come from unauthorized access to stored, in-vehicle personal 
information both about the user and about everyone and 
everything the vehicle has encountered.  Strong security 
measures—from intense physical security to data encryption 
and access authentication—would be essential for protecting 
the privacy of personal information generated by 
selfcontained autonomous vehicles.  Using force or falsehoods 
to gain the user’s consent to access personal information 
contained in the autonomous vehicle would present yet 
another category of privacy risk. 
Appropriate design of autonomous vehicles can of course 
minimize risks to personal information.88  Use of anonymous 
information, rather than personal information, can provide 
additional protection against risks to personal information 
privacy interests described here.  Assuring that autonomous 
vehicles only collect, transmit, or use personal information 
with the knowledge and informed consent of the person using 
the autonomous vehicle, will also be important to reducing 
privacy risks in all types of autonomous vehicles. 
C.  Surveillance Privacy Interests 
Surveillance privacy interests respond to people’s 
aversion to being constantly watched, tracked or monitored as 
they travel from place to place.  At the same time, 
surveillance privacy interests also reflect political and 
philosophical opposition to pervasive scrutiny of everyone 
who travels, particularly if that scrutiny is controlled by 
government.  These underlying political implications of 
 
 88. See discussion infra Part V (regarding optimizing privacy and 
autonomous vehicle interactions). 
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surveillance are sometimes captured by the age-old question: 
“Who watches the watchmen?”89  In fact the challenge of 
keeping in check those who have concentrated knowledge 
about how people live their lives and move about in the world 
seems even more intense in the digital twenty-first century. 
Use of autonomous vehicles for surveillance purposes, 
could compromise something more than just autonomy and 
personal information privacy interests of individuals.  Indeed, 
surveillance using autonomous vehicles could threaten the 
political and social well-being of our society.  As Supreme 
Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted in her concurring 
opinion in United States v. Jones, “Awareness that the 
Government may be watching chills associational and 
expressive freedoms.  And the Government’s unrestrained 
power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity 
is susceptible to abuse.”90  She also pointed out that “making 
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum 
of intimate [GPS location] information about any person 
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to 
track,” may “ ‘ alter the relationship between citizen and 
government in a way that is inimical to democratic 
society.’ ” 91  Surveillance privacy interests reflect these 
societal concerns about the importance of individual privacy 
as the foundation of a free society. 
Surveillance is a relatively modern idea.  Even the word, 
“surveillance,” is fairly new to the English language.  It was 
borrowed from the French by the British at the turn of the 
nineteenth century to refer to looking over an area, usually 
from a high place, for strategic information about a battlefield 
or prospective confrontation.92  Early in the twentieth 
century, surveillance usually suggested use of technology to 
enhance human abilities to see over wide distances to collect 
comprehensive information about an adversary.93  Since then, 
 
 89. This phrase is translated from Latin: “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?”  
JUVENAL, SATIRE VI, (ca. 55 AD) lines 347–48. 
 90. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
 91. Id. (citing United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)). 
 92. Surveillance, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford Univ. Press 2d 
ed. 1989). 
 93. For example, aerial reconnaissance became a major factor around World 
War I.  See Nicholas M. Short, Sr., History of Remote Sensing: In the Beginning; 
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the word, “surveillance,” has been used in a wide variety of 
careful-watching contexts from medical surveillance of 
diseases and immune responses, to physical stakeouts of 
crime suspects, to mass-scale electronic and network 
surveillance for gathering intelligence or for seeking evidence 
of anomalous or criminal behavior.  Surveillance is also a 
psychological technique used to affect human behavior 
through pervasive monitoring of activities and areas to 
discourage people from violating rules or laws. 
Although surveillance most often means covert collection 
of information, it can also refer to overt watching aimed at 
modifying the behavior of those watched.  An example of 
overt surveillance is red-light cameras.  These devices are 
often prominently placed as ever-present watchers at 
intersections so that drivers are deterred from entering 
intersections while the stoplight is red.94  One purpose of 
overt surveillance is to affect the behavior of those being 
watched, to assure that individual behavior conforms to 
societal norms.  If an autonomous vehicle user were informed 
that his or her vehicle continuously reports its speed to law 
enforcement authorities, that user would be more likely to 
direct the vehicle to conform to the speed limit, rather than 
exercise personal autonomy in deciding not to conform.95  
Similarly, autonomous vehicles could overtly monitor the 
behavior of vehicle users so that instances of user activities 
such as smoking or drinking alcohol are sensed and recorded.   
One purpose of overt surveillance is to interfere with 
individual autonomy through the power of scrutiny.  Even 
potential scrutiny can be sufficient to control behavior, as 
Jeremy Bentham suggested in his design for the Panopticon 
Prison.96  Such direct, announced interference with personal 
 
Launch Vehicles, FAS.ORG, http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/docs/rst/Intro/Part2 
_7.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 94. Koppel, supra note 28. 
 95. Some insurance companies promote devices that monitor and reward or 
punish driver behavior (e.g., speeding, sutten starts or stops, driving at 
dangerous times in dangerous places, etc.) in terms of lower or higher insurance 
premiums.  For example, Progressive Insurance’s SnapShot program urges 
drivers to use a tracking device to keep track of driving habits in order to 
qualify for a discount.  See Snapshot Common Questions, PROGRESSIVE 
INSURANCE, available at http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshot-common-
questions.aspx (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 96. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE 
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autonomy would likely seriously impair trust and confidence 
in autonomous vehicles.  As a result, developers of 
autonomous vehicles would be unlikely to equip autonomous 
vehicles for overt surveillance, unless a government 
regulation required it. 
Covert surveillance by autonomous vehicles secretly 
collecting and reporting personal information seems more 
likely.  Such surveillance is often conducted remotely so that 
it remains hidden from those being monitored.  Given the 
sophisticated technologies applied in autonomous vehicles, 
technically unsophisticated users may not understand an 
autonomous vehicle’s potential surveillance capabilities to 
collect, store, or share personal information about its user.  
These covert surveillance capabilities include both targeted 
surveillance of a particular person and mass surveillance of 
groups or populations. 
1. Targeted Surveillance 
Targeted surveillance keeps track of a particular 
identified human person, who would otherwise expect to be 
let alone, and certainly not to be followed.  Such surveillance 
nearly always involves surreptitiously collecting detailed 
personal information about the targeted individual and 
keeping track of the target’s every move.  Usually, this type of 
information collection is not conducted openly.  For example, 
assume that an autonomous vehicle generates personal 
information about a user’s location in real time without the 
user’s knowledge or consent.  If communicated beyond the 
vehicle, this real-time information would make it possible to 
locate the targeted user all of the time, as well as to maintain 
a comprehensive record of all the places the user has been.  
When this personal information is transmitted or disclosed to 
recipients unknown to the target, such surveillance 
compromises both autonomy and personal information 
privacy interests.  This is the type of vehicle tracking that, 
because no warrant authorized installation of the tracking 
device, was held unconstitutional by the United States 




 97. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
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Unless personal information from autonomous vehicle is 
encrypted and rendered anonymous, interconnected 
autonomous vehicles communicating location and other data 
back and forth over a wireless network could be very useful 
tools for invisible targeted surveillance.  Absent data 
encryption and anonymity, access to an autonomous vehicle 
network would enable immediate remote access to the real 
time location of an autonomous vehicle and its user.  Such 
access would also enable collection of longitudinal records of 
past locations.  As a result, access to the interconnected 
autonomous vehicle network, would enable law enforcement, 
national security, and other types of public and private 
agencies to conduct remote surveillance of the vehicle’s user.  
When a third party, such as a network operator, is a 
repository of personal information collected through such 
surveillance, privacy protection would be even further 
compromised.98  This personal information held by third 
parties would be available to government and private sector 
investigators through subpoenas or administrative orders, 
without the target of the surveillance ever knowing that the 
information exists.  Indeed, law enforcement access to certain 
stored personal information from such a network may require 
neither probable cause nor a warrant.99 
A selfcontained autonomous vehicle could also be tracked 
and its user targeted for surveillance in real time.  However, 
the vehicle itself would not be transmitting the surveillance 
information.  Unless connected to a network or attached to a 
tracking device, a selfcontained autonomous vehicle would 
not itself enable remote real-time tracking.  However, to the 
extent that the vehicle keeps historical information, such as 
 
 98. See discussion of Third-Party information supra text accompanying note 
83 and infra Part IV.  In her concurring opinion in United States v. Jones, 
Justice Sotomayor suggested that “it may be necessary to reconsider the 
premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).  Justice Sotomayor also noted, 
“This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal 
of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out 
mundane tasks.”  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 99. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 27012712 (2012).  See In re 
Application of the United States of America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
GLANCY FINAL 11/15/2012 8:46 PM 
2012] PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 1211 
past itineraries, about the surveillance target, that 
information could be extracted from the selfcontained 
autonomous vehicle by those with access to the computer 
systems inside the vehicle.  Unlawful access by breaking into 
the vehicle would possibly be deterred by burglary and other 
laws.  Law enforcement extraction of surveillance information 
from a selfcontained autonomous vehicle would likely require 
at least probable cause as well as a warrant.100 
Use of autonomous vehicles comprehensively to keep 
track of the whereabouts of a targeted individual in all places 
and at all times can exert substantial control over that 
individual.  Maintaining centralized information about an 
individual compromises individual self-determination and 
autonomy and can be harmful to the individual’s 
psychological health.  Comprehensive centralized surveillance 
systems concentrated on an individual can also influence the 
individual’s future choices by keeping track of each time that 
individual visits socially or politically “unacceptable” 
locations.  The New York Court of Appeals described the 
impact of targeted surveillance:  “Disclosed in [tracking] data 
. . . will be trips the indisputably private nature of which 
takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, 
the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment 
center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-
the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or 
church, the gay bar and on and on.”101 
Targeted surveillance compromises an important aspect 
of individual autonomy—the ability to resist being 
categorized, manipulated psychologically, intimidated, or 
mechanistically predicted by society or the government.  
When an individual is subject to being constantly watched, 
that person does not feel free to question or to oppose those in 
charge of the surveillance system. 
2. Mass Surveillance 
Mass surveillance involves indiscriminate and 
comprehensive collection of personal information from 
 
 100. See discussion of Fourth Amendment issues infra Part IV. 
 101. People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441–42 (2009).  Justice Sotomayor 
quoted this passage in her concurring opinion in Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946, 
95556. 
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everyone within an area or sector.  This type of large-scale 
surveillance of a population can also function as an 
instrument of control over the behavior of every individual 
within that population.  Jeremy Bentham suggested this use 
of mass surveillance in his design for an efficient prison 
which he called the panopticon—all-seeing device.102 
Applied to autonomous vehicles, mass surveillance could 
seek to collect personal information about all those who use 
autonomous vehicles.  Such mass surveillance would collect 
and define behavior patterns of autonomous vehicle users.  
These profiles could later be useful for such purposes as (i) 
creating algorithmic profiles of typical autonomous vehicle 
users, (ii) predicting each autonomous vehicle user’s 
individual behavior, or (iii) finding one autonomous vehicle 
that may or may not be behaving according to prescribed 
patterns. 
Mass surveillance is sometimes confused with intense, 
comprehensive surveillance of a targeted person.  For 
example, surveillance of the suspected drug dealer, Antoine 
Jones, in United States v. Jones constructed a comprehensive 
pattern, or mosaic, of highly detailed information about 
Jones’s activities and used that mosaic to locate his drug 
stash house.103  Real-time information from the GPS 
surveillance device attached to his vehicle allowed law 
enforcement to follow Jones and to see him traveling to the 
stash house where he was arrested.  Just about every 
investigative tool in the law enforcement surveillance arsenal 
was used against Jones: wiretaps, physical following, fixed-
camera surveillance, as well as attachment of a GPS tracking 
device to his vehicle, so that the device automatically and 
continuously located Jones and recorded his every movement.  
However, the GPS tracking was crucial; and it was the 
warrantless installation of the GPS device that caused the 
United States Supreme Court to overturn Jones’s criminal 
conviction.  These efforts by law enforcement to follow Jones 
everywhere and to collect detailed information about what he 
was doing and with whom he was doing it all of the time was 
intensive, comprehensive targeted surveillance using massive 
resources.  But such tracking was not mass surveillance, 
 
 102. See FOUCAULT, supra note 96, at 195–228. 
 103. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946. 
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since the government has not yet tried to watch everyone in 
the District of Columbia as intensively as law enforcement 
agencies targeted Jones.  Nevertheless, the potential for 
scaling up the type of massive surveillance used to convict 
Jones into region-wide mass surveillance of all persons, 
including those not suspected of criminal activity, troubled 
some of the Justices who decided Jones. 
Mass surveillance operates at a different level from the 
comprehensive surveillance that targeted Jones.  Instead, 
mass surveillance indiscriminately collects personal 
information about large numbers of people on a population-
wide basis.104  Usually mass surveillance is covert so as not to 
affect the patterns of human behavior being recorded.  But 
mass surveillance can also be overt, as Jeremy Bentham 
suggested for the Panopticon Prison.105  Automated photo-
radar is sometimes used in this open way to deter speeding by 
announcing that all vehicles on a particular road will have 
their speeds and license plates recorded, and driver 
photographs taken, so that citations can be sent 
automatically to those who were speeding.  Some towns 
engage in overt mass surveillance when they post signs that a 
photograph of every vehicle and its license plate is taken 
upon entering or leaving the municipality.106 
Mass surveillance that collects personal information from 
everyone on the road is not necessary for most transportation 
management and planning purposes.  Anonymous data 
identifying neither vehicles nor drivers is sufficient for 
calculating traffic flows or road usage for transportation 
management and land use planning purposes.  For example, 
 
 104. Mass surveillance literally gathers up all available information about all 
persons within range of the surveillance.  Officials hope that some of this 
personal information may turn out to be relevant to investigative or intelligence 
issues.  The hated general warrants in pre-revolutionary America outlawed by 
the Fourth Amendment were a form of mass surveillance.  See Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 
(1974).  Sometimes called “dragnet” surveillance, mass surveillance has been 
analogized to Forrest Gump’s famous aphorism: “Life is like a box of chocolates, 
you never know what you are going to get.”  Similarly, “Mass surveillance is like 
a box of chocolates, police never know what they are going to get.”  FORREST 
GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994). 
 105. FOUCAULT, supra note 97, at 195–228. 
 106. See Will Jason, Tiburon’s Roadside Security Cameras Set to Go Live 
Soon, MARIN INDEP. J. (July 27, 2010), available at http://www.marin 
ij.com/marinnews/ci_15616255. 
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cameras recording roadway traffic flows often use low-
resolution optics incapable of capturing specific vehicles or 
license plates.  Loop detectors or other sensors that do not 
identify particular vehicles are used to collect information 
about how many vehicles use particular road segments at 
particular times and how fast vehicles in general are moving 
on those segments.  In contrast, more precise roadway 
surveillance that collects specific identifying information 
about each vehicle or person on a roadway facilitates use of 
that information for purposes other than counting cars or 
determining traffic speeds.  For example, roadway 
surveillance that identifies vehicles or drivers may be used to 
enforce traffic laws, as well as to find or to follow a particular 
person for further investigation. 
Roadway surveillance information that collects personal 
data about everyone is often used to compile profiles of people 
who use particular routes.  Mass-collected personal data 
profiles of individuals’ travel patterns can be used not only by 
law enforcement, but by marketers and advertisers who use 
the data to predict and manipulate future consumer behavior, 
for example through direct behavioral advertising.  Such 
detailed personal information about an autonomous vehicle 
user’s locations and on-road behavior can be highly valuable 
both to the government and to private sector enterprises of 
many different types, such as news media, private 
investigators, insurance companies, vehicle product 
manufacturers, and political campaigns. 
The interconnected version of autonomous vehicles could 
enable mass surveillance in the form of comprehensive, 
detailed tracking of all autonomous vehicles and their users 
at all times and places.  The networked nature of this type of 
autonomous vehicle involves a communications network that 
transmits and receives information related to each particular 
vehicle.  Being able to identify specific devices may be 
necessary for network security.  But, unless measures are 
taken to assure anonymity as well as data security, the 
resulting comprehensive personal information collection could 
be used to profile, predict, and perhaps manipulate the 
behavior of the vehicles and their users.  Law enforcement, 
private investigators, advertisers, and marketers will all be 
eager to seek access to an interconnected autonomous vehicle 
network, as well as to the personal data transmitted through 
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such a network, unless the network is carefully planned to 
preserve and protect privacy. 
It is interesting to note that selfcontained autonomous 
vehicles could be used for a different type of mass 
surveillance.  These vehicles rely on arrays of externally 
facing sensors that will continuously collect detailed 
information about the roadway environment surrounding the 
vehicle.  Information from these sensors is processed by the 
vehicle’s analytic systems that enable the vehicle to 
distinguish toddlers from fireplugs.  As a result, the 
selfcontained vehicle will collect detailed data about 
everywhere the vehicle travels, as well as everything and 
everyone encountered.  In some ways, a selfcontained 
autonomous vehicle operates as a “mobile panopticon” that 
moves along roads and highways and literally takes in all 
details about what is going on in the areas through which the 
vehicle travels.  Based on such mass surveillance concerns, 
Federal Communications Commission imposed sanctions on 
Google, for collection of wireless information by “Street 
View.”107 
Mass surveillance collection and use of personal 
information about large numbers of people also compromises 
autonomy privacy interests.  Surveillance systems—whether 
they are law enforcement programs, traffic management 
systems, or private marketing systems—all directly affect the 
autonomy of travelers by overriding individual control over 
who or what watches and keeps track of their movements 
from place to place.  When the government controls such 
universal surveillance, political concerns about centralizing 
too much power in a potentially overbearing state reinforce 
privacy concerns.  Authoritarian systems can misuse such 
mass surveillance systems to round up suspects or to treat 
individuals or whole categories of people as undesirable or 
deserving sanctions based on where they are or where they 
have been.  Personal mobility is an aspect of people’s lives 
that totalitarian political systems particularly seek to control. 
Travelers forced to look over their shoulders for 
surveillance systems are affected both by knowing and by not 
 
 107. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, “In the Matter of Google, Inc.” F.C.C. Order No. 
DA 12-592 (April 13, 2012), available at  http://transition.fcc.gov/DA-12-
592A1.pdf. 
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knowing whether or when others are watching their actions 
or capturing personal information about them.  Particularly 
when a person chooses to do something unconventional or 
considers going to a potentially notorious destination, such 
uncertainty can be stifling. 
IV. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
Whether autonomous vehicles present a context in which 
people can and should expect protection for privacy interests 
is a contentious issue.  In legal evaluations of privacy claims, 
“reasonable expectations of privacy” analysis is a familiar 
way to make an initial determination whether legal 
protection for privacy interests would be appropriate under 
particular circumstances.  Inquiring into reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the context of autonomous vehicles 
asks whether society should protect privacy in this setting, in 
light of other societal interests, such as safety, convenience, 
economic, and environmental concerns. 
Reasonable expectation of privacy analysis is normally 
associated with legal decisions about whether to enforce 
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by excluding evidence from criminal 
prosecutions.108  In addition, reasonable expectations of 
privacy also play a normative role in determining the 
“protectability” of privacy interests in tort law,109 as well as 
statutory110 and regulatory111 law.  Asking about whether 
expectations of privacy are reasonable raises policy issues 
about whether privacy protection is desirable or appropriate 
in a particular setting, such as autonomous vehicles.  Because 
autonomous vehicles are not yet available for general use, 
predictions about privacy expectations regarding autonomous 
vehicles necessarily have to be extrapolated from experience 
with other types of vehicles, transportation issues, and 
 
 108. E.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 109. See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999). 
 110. See, for example, the federal Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 
U.S.C. § 1801 and California’s adopted version at section 1708.8 of the 
California Civil Code.  Both concern physical or constructive invasions of 
privacy. 
 111. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Regulations that Support 
Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies, 6 C.F.R. §§ 25.1–25.9. 
(2012). 
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intelligent systems. 
The concept of reasonable expectations of privacy is often 
associated with a 1967 United States Supreme Court 
decision, Katz v. United States.112  Katz excluded from 
evidence in a criminal prosecution defendant’s conversations 
recorded by law enforcement from outside a public phone 
booth located on a public street.  In ruling that the Fourth 
Amendment “protects people, not places,” the Supreme Court 
rejected basing Fourth Amendment warrant requirements 
solely on location and interference with property rights.113  
Older analysis had routinely withheld Fourth Amendment 
protections from activities in public places and from 
intangible intrusions.114  After the decision in Katz, neither 
the fact that an activity takes place in a public setting, nor 
the fact that the evidence seized is intangible forecloses 
Fourth Amendment constitutional protection for privacy 
interests.  Since most of the personal information generated 
by autonomous vehicles will be intangible digital data 
collected in public roadway settings, the Katz decision is 
important in understanding the basis for Fourth Amendment 
protection for expectations of privacy in autonomous 
vehicles.115 
 
 112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 113. Id. at 351–52.  Although the defendant’s conversations took place in a 
public location, the Court insisted that “what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”  Id. 
 114. E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967). 
 115. In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan suggested that 
deciding what should and should not be protected as reasonable expectations of 
privacy could be based on “a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”  Katz, 
389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Even in situations where each of 
the two steps suggested by Justice Harlan is not literally followed, reasonable 
expectations of privacy analysis is used to balance Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests of an individual with societal interests.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27 (2001).  Occasionally “reasonable” expectation of privacy analysis has 
asked whether a privacy expectation is “justifiable,” for example, in United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) and in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989), or “legitimate,” for example, in Couch v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 540 
(2001), or sometimes all three, for example, in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
294, 315 (1987). 
Critics of “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis, such as Justice 
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Katz and decisions following it do not mean that all 
intangible communications in all public places will always be 
automatically protected as private.  But these decisions do 
suggest that communications among interconnected 
autonomous vehicles or between autonomous vehicles and 
roadside infrastructure, other mobile devices or the cloud 
would be eligible for Fourth Amendment protection.  No such 
cases have arisen yet.  The focus in Katz on the individual as 
the basis for privacy rights, rather than the place where the 
individual is located, makes Fourth Amendment protection 
for people using autonomous vehicles more likely. 
Recent court decisions appear to have turned an 
important corner toward recognizing expanded constitutional 
protections for privacy in autonomous vehicles.  This is quite 
a change from the past when privacy expectations of people in 
vehicles on public roadways were often described as ranging 
from very low to virtually absent.116  Past reluctance to find 
expectations of privacy reasonable in vehicular contexts 
reflected two now-receding factors: (1) a general notion that 
public roadways are, by their very nature, not places where 
people should expect privacy and (2) exceptions to Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirements that seemingly excluded 
vehicles from constitutional protection.  In the twenty-first 
century, courts are reconsidering both of these factors.  In 
fact, expansion of Fourth Amendment protection for people in 
vehicles on public roadways is a noticeable trend in court 
decisions over the past fifteen years.  By the time autonomous 
 
Scalia, complain that reasonable expectation of privacy analysis lacks any 
“plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment.”  Minnesota v. 
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).  In Justice Scalia’s view, 
the use of reasonable expectations of privacy is blatantly subjective and “self-
indulgent.”  Id.  Justice Scalia slyly suggests that “unsurprisingly, those ‘actual 
(subjective) expectations of privacy’ ‘that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable,’ . . . bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy 
that this Court considers reasonable.”  Id.  In his view, the answer to what 
expectations of privacy are reasonable seems to be resolved by judges deciding 
what seems reasonable to them.  In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012), Justice Scalia’s opinion for the court refuses to apply Katz or reasonable 
expectations of privacy as the basis for the court’s decision.  Rather, his opinion 
focuses on trespass to personal property (Jones’s vehicle) that enabled collection 
of evidence against Jones.  Id. at 951. 
 116.   See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  The Supreme Court 
in United States v. Jones, distinguished Knotts as limited to “beeper” 
technology.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95152. 
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vehicles become accepted consumer products, recognition of 
reasonable expectations of privacy related to persons in 
vehicles on public roadways may well be unquestioned. 
A. Public Roadway Privacy Expectations 
Public roadways are frequently used as illustrations of 
settings where privacy is not reasonably expected.  Roads are 
contrasted with homes where privacy expectations are 
high.117  But that does not mean that no expectations of 
privacy on public roads are ever reasonable, or worthy of legal 
protection.118  Societal interests in managing transportation 
and roadways so that public roads are not used for nefarious 
purposes have had enduring importance.119  At the same time, 
concerns about surveillance privacy interests and excessive 
government power in this setting also were recognized early 
in the history of the automobile.120
Early twentieth century automobiles and paved roads 
resulted in criminal suspects using vehicles on public 
roadways to violate the law.  Law enforcement agents 
followed.  During Prohibition,
 They have become 
increasingly significant. 
121 the United States Supreme 
Court upheld many types of law enforcement efforts to stop 
suspected liquor smuggling.122  Carroll v. United States123
 
 117. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (involving the use of a 
thermal imaging device from a public vantage point to monitor the radiation of 
heat revealing a marijuana growth inside a person’s home). 
 was 
 118. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N. L. REV. 295, 
295–99 (2004). 
 119. For example, the thirteenth century nightwalker statutes in England, 
Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, Stat. 2, ch.4 (1285), were among the 
precursors of twentieth-century vagrancy laws, struck down on void-for-
vagueness grounds in such cases as Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), 
and Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).  Local anti-
cruising ordinances, such as that upheld in Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255 
(3d Cir. 1990), are more modern manifestations of law enforcement concerns 
about roadways.  See also ROGER D. MCGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN 
AND VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE FRONTIER (1984). 
 120. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 
531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (ratified 1919, repealed 1933).  Roadway 
surveillance continued even after bootleggers ceased to pose a problem after 
Prohibition was repealed in 1933 by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (ratified 1933). 
 122. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which upheld 
warrantless wiretapping, reflects another of these efforts to prosecute purveyors 
of illegal alcohol.  Olmstead was famously overturned in Katz and Berger v. New 
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the most prominent of the Prohibition-era automobile search 
and seizure cases.  This United States Supreme Court 
decision approved warrantless stopping and searching of cars 
suspected of transporting contraband liquor, but required law 
enforcement agents to have probable cause to believe that the 
cars they stopped were carrying contraband alcohol.  The 
Court’s opinion in Carroll did not require a judicial warrant 
before law enforcement agents could stop and search vehicles 
of suspected bootleggers.  But Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for 
the Court took pains to recognize that people on public 
highways do retain privacy rights.  The Court’s opinion 
specifically rejected authorizing law enforcement agents “to 
stop every automobile . . . and thus subject all persons 
lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and 
indignity of such a search.”124  Law enforcement searches of 
everybody on the road would clearly be “intolerable and 
unreasonable.”125  Mass surveillance of all people on all 
roadways would not be permissible under the Constitution.  
Chief Justice Taft expressed particular concern about 
interference with the rights of people using the public 
highways “to free passage without interruption or search 
unless there is known to a competent official authorized to 
search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are 
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.”126 
Seventy-five years later, the United States Supreme 
Court decided in Indianapolis v. Edmond that stopping every 
automobile on a roadway for general law enforcement 
purposes constitutes a seizure for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment that requires a judicial warrant.127  The case 
involved law enforcement roadblocks that stopped vehicles 
that might be carrying illegal drugs.  The Court’s decision 
expressed uneasiness with earlier constitutional analysis that 
had appeared automatically to exclude public roads from 
eligibility for privacy protection.  Holding that a law 
enforcement drug interdiction program that stopped all cars 
along a highway was an unlawful intrusion, the Court 
 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 123. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 124. Id. at 153–54. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 154. 
 127. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
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refused to “sanction [highway] stops justified only by the 
generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation 
and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has 
committed some crime.”128  The Court’s opinion insists on 
“drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve 
the general interest in crime control.”  According to the Court, 
part of the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to prevent 
such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American 
Life.”129  The Supreme Court’s decision in Edmond signaled 
an important shift in policy toward protection of 
constitutional rights on public roadways.  In the Court’s view, 
such protection is necessary in order to prevent dangerous 
trends toward authoritarian political power. 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Edmond, courts 
have increasingly recognized and protected privacy rights 
associated with vehicles on public roads.  In Arizona v. Gant, 
a case involving a search incident to an arrest, Justice 
Stevens warned against “undervalu[ing] the privacy interests 
at stake.  Although we have recognized that a motorist’s 
privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his 
home, . . . the former interest [of motorists] is nevertheless 
important and deserving of constitutional protection.”130  His 
opinion noted that “authoriz[ing] police officers to search not 
just the passenger compartment but every purse, briefcase, or 
other container within that space” is dangerous.131  The Court 
rejected “A rule that gives police the power to conduct such a 
search whenever an individual is caught committing a traffic 
offense, when there is no basis for believing evidence of the 
offense might be found in the vehicle.”  Such a rule is 
unacceptable because it “creates a serious and recurring 
threat to the privacy of countless individuals.”132  The Court 
emphasized that the character of the threat to the privacy of 
so many people, “implicates the central concern underlying 
the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police 
officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a 
person’s private effects.”133 
 
 128. Id. at 44. 
 129. Id. at 42. 
 130. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009). 
 131. Id. at 345. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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Twenty-first century courts have been increasingly 
willing to find and protect privacy expectations on public 
roads because of concerns about the destructive power of 
surveillance and wariness about excessive societal control 
that leads to authoritarianism.  As a result, it is likely that if 
law enforcement agencies were to use an autonomous vehicle 
communications network to control or to stop an 
interconnected autonomous vehicle on a public road, such a 
seizure would be subject to constitutional protection requiring 
at least a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.134  United 
States v. Jones suggests that a warrant may be required 
before such an intrusion.  Moreover, in United States v. Jones 
the Court protected Fourth Amendment personal information 
privacy interests in data about one’s movement from place to 
place.135  Use of an interconnected autonomous vehicle 
communications network to provide evidence of traffic 
violations, such as excessive speed, also appears to call for 
Constitutional protection.136  The Court’s decision in United 
States v. Jones specifically requires a warrant before law 
enforcement agents can legally attach a tracking device to a 
vehicle and then use the device remotely and continuously to 
follow a suspect’s vehicle on public roadways.137  Of course, if 
law enforcement sought to break into a selfcontained 
autonomous vehicle to retrieve evidence of past locations or 
activities, such action would also require a warrant. 
One of the central issues posed in the Jones case was 
whether Jones had reasonable privacy expectations protected 
by the Fourth Amendment as he drove his wife’s car around 
the Washington, D.C. area for a month with a government-
installed GPS tracking device capturing every move the 
vehicle and its driver made.  During oral argument, members 
of the Court asked a number of questions about a possible 
analogy between a person driving a vehicle on which law 
enforcement had secretly installed a GPS tracking device and 
 
 134. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (requiring at least a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity for stopping a vehicle). 
 135. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 136. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).  The concurring opinions in Jones are 
particularly emphatic about this point. 
 137. Id. at 949.  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court is particularly 
concerned about the intrusion on the vehicle owner’s autonomy when law 
enforcement agents installed the GPS device. 
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a person wearing an overcoat to which law enforcement 
agents had surreptitiously attached a GPS device.138
B. Vehicle Exceptions to Fourth Amendment Warrant 
Requirements  
  The 
implication was that just as an overcoat wearer reasonably 
expects not to be tracked, a vehicle driver also reasonably 
expects not to be tracked.  This analogy raises the intriguing 
question of whether using an autonomous car could be in 
some ways like wearing an overcoat—at least with regard to 
expectations of privacy.  If an overcoat wearer reasonably 
expects that he or she will not be tracked through an unseen 
device attached to his or her overcoat, it is at least arguable 
that an autonomous car user should also reasonably expect 
that he or she would not be tracked through the autonomous 
vehicle network.  The decision in United States v. Jones 
suggests that, unless a warrant is first secured, automated 
remote tracking of an autonomous vehicle on public roadways 
would interfere with reasonable expectations of privacy 
protected under the Fourth Amendment. 
A second factor that in the past seemed to indicate lower 
expectations of privacy regarding motor vehicles is what is 
called the “automobile” exception to Fourth Amendment 
prohibitions against warrantless searches.  Although the 
words seem to imply that automobiles are not subject to 
Fourth Amendment protections at all, the “automobile 
exception” never meant that vehicles were completely exempt 
from Fourth Amendment privacy protection.  Nor did the 
exception ever mean that all intrusions on autonomy privacy 
and interference with personal information privacy through 
searches of vehicles were constitutionally permissible.  The 
vehicle exception does not apply to seizures of automobiles at 
all, although in some cases an automobile search is of a 
vehicle that has already been lawfully seized.  Over time, the 
application of this exception has become increasingly narrow, 
to the point that it is unlikely to diminish or adversely  
affect reasonable expectations of privacy in most  
 
 138. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, 18–20, 31, United States v. Jones 
(2011) (No. 10-1259), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf (questions from Kennedy, Sotomayor & 
Kagan, JJ.)  (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
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autonomous vehicles. 
In its current form, the automobile exception only 
exempts law enforcement from having to secure a judicial 
warrant before searching a vehicle after the vehicle has been 
lawfully stopped.  All other Constitutional protections apply, 
except for the requirement of a judicial warrant before the 
vehicle is searched.  Importantly, law enforcement agents 
searching stopped vehicles have to establish and document 
probable cause before any warrantless vehicle search.  Three 
reasons have been asserted to justify this narrow exception: 
(1) the fact that vehicles are inherently mobile, (2) what is 
sometimes considered to be a reduced (but not absent) 
expectation of privacy in a vehicle and (3) historical 
distinctions between searches of automobiles as compared 
with dwellings.139  The first reason has by now become the 
main justification. 
Under the Constitution, all vehicle searches must be 
reasonable, as well as justified by a finding of probable cause 
based on objective evidence.  This probable cause requirement 
for all vehicle searches is a tough standard.  Law enforcement 
agents have the burden of showing objective facts that 
amount to probable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped 
vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity or contraband.  
Subjective beliefs and suspicions are insufficient.  Only if law 
enforcement agents have first made a fact-based finding of 
probable cause are they excused from having to secure a 
judicial warrant to authorize a vehicle search.  Such 
intrusions on autonomy privacy as searching areas of the 
vehicle where such evidence might be found have to be based 
on objective facts demonstrating probable cause.140  Assuming 
that a future autonomous vehicle was lawfully stopped, under 
current interpretations of the automobile exception, the 
vehicle would be subject to warrantless search only if law 
enforcement agents had sufficient objective facts to determine 
that there is probable cause that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found in the autonomous vehicle. 
A series of twenty-first century United States Supreme 
Court decisions have rejected earlier standards that would 
 
 139. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391–93 (1985). 
 140. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009); United States v. Ross, 456 
U.S. 798 (1982); People v. Panah, 35 Cal. 4th 395, 469 (2005). 
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have permitted vehicle searches based on law enforcement 
agents’ subjective suspicions.141  Courts now repeatedly state 
that more lax police practices than objective findings of 
probable cause are unacceptable in a democratic society.  
These days, automobile search decisions, reported and 
unreported, usually rely on Gant142 to require greater 
protection for privacy before vehicles can be searched.  This 
trend toward making it more difficult for law enforcement 
agents to search a vehicle without first having secured a 
judicial warrant, is based in part on concerns about law 
enforcement overreaching as well as worries about the 
potential for remote surveillance such as that denounced in 
the separate concurring opinions in United States v. Jones.143 
Recent court decisions interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment have paid increasing attention to enhanced 
expectations of privacy in the contexts of roadways,144 of 
vehicles,145 and of technologically enhanced searches.146  Since 
use of autonomous vehicles will involve all of these contextual 
factors, privacy expectations in autonomous vehicles should 
be protected under the Fourth Amendment.  Indeed, the full 
range of privacy interests discussed above—from autonomy to 
personal information to surveillance—are included in the 
reasonable expectations of privacy of people who in the future 
will use autonomous vehicles. 
V.  OPTIMIZING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVACY AND 
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
As autonomous vehicles begin to be marketed to people in 
the United States, privacy protection will help to foster trust 
in these new modes of travel.  Without appropriate legal 
protections for privacy, autonomous vehicles could well meet 
“market resistance” from potential users who perceive 
autonomous vehicles as threats to their privacy.  Similarly, 
assuring respect for user privacy is one of the best ways to 
 
 141. Gant involved a search of a vehicle incident to an arrest of the driver.  
Gant, 556 U.S. at 344. 
 142. Id. 
 143. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–55 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); Id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 144. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009). 
 145. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at  945. 
 146. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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foster trust and confidence in new technologies such as 
autonomous vehicles. 
The most efficient and effective strategy for optimizing 
interactions between privacy and autonomous vehicles is 
through building privacy protection into autonomous vehicles 
from the start.  Being proactive about privacy also helps in 
strengthening user trust.  Such a strategy has been 
popularized as “privacy by design,” a concept derived from 
values-in-design methodologies long advocated by privacy 
theorists such as Helen Nissenbaum.147  The Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has proposed privacy by design as a way 
to integrate privacy into applications of technology, 
particularly online technologies.148  One FTC commissioner 
described privacy by design as “baking in” privacy, as if a 
technology application were a cake and privacy a key 
ingredient.149  A number of United States companies already 
follow their own versions of privacy by design to integrate 
privacy considerations into business models, consumer 
product design, product development cycles, and new 
technology applications.  Companies such as Microsoft, 
Google, IBM, and Hewlett-Packard apply privacy by design in 
developing new products.150  The White House has also 
endorsed privacy by design.151  In the transportation sector, 
privacy by design was suggested as a useful strategy for 
Intelligent Transportation Systems as early as 2008.152 
In Canada, Anne Cavoukian, Ontario’s Information and 
Privacy Commissioner, is a major proponent of privacy by 
design.  She insists that, “Privacy assurance must ideally 
become an organization’s default mode of operation” and 
describes privacy by design as “a holistic view of privacy 
 
 147. HELEN F. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 1–10 (Stanford Univ. 
Press 2010). 
 148. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 49; see also In the Matter of Google 
Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011). 
 149. Julie Brill, FTC Commissioner, Opening Remarks at W3C Meeting (Apr. 
11, 2012) at 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/120411w3c 
remarks.pdf. 
 150. Kashmir Hill, Why ‘Privacy By Design’ Is the New Corporate Hotness, 
FORBES (July 28, 2011, 10:23 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/ 
2011/07/28/why-privacy-by-design-is-the-new-corporate-hotness/. 
 151. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63. 
 152. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, USING VEHICLE INTEGRATION 
DATA, PART 2: CROSS-CUTTING VII DATA ISSUES, 87th Annual Meeting, 
Washington, D.C., Session 682 (Jan. 16, 2008). 
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protection.”  It 
prescribes that privacy be embedded directly into the 
design and operation of not only information technologies, 
but also of business practices, physical design and 
networked infrastructure.  This broad-based perspective 
on privacy requires that attention be paid to responsible 
information management throughout all of the 
interacting, interrelated, and interdependent elements 
that comprise organizations and their assorted lines of 
business.153 
Ms. Cavoukian’s privacy-by-design approach rests on seven 
foundation principles, beginning with the importance of being 
“Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial.”154  Other 
Privacy by Design principles include Privacy as the Default 
Setting, Privacy Embedded Directly into Design, Full 
Functionality (Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum), End-to-End 
Security (Full Lifecycle Protection), Visibility and 
Transparency, and Respect for User Privacy (Keep it User-
Centric).155 
 
 153. ANN CAVOUKIAN & MARILYN PROSCH, PRIVACY BY REDESIGN: BUILDING 
A BETTER LEGACY 1 (2011), available at http://privacybydesign.ca/ 
content/uploads/2011/05/PbRD.pdf. 
 154. Id. at 1. 
 155. Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles explains each of these 
principles: 
1. Proactive Not Reactive; Preventative Not Remedial   
The Privacy by Design (PbD) approach is characterized by 
proactive rather than reactive measures.  It anticipates and 
prevents privacy invasive events before they happen.  PbD does 
not wait for privacy risks to materialize, nor does it offer remedies 
for resolving privacy infractions once they have occurred – it aims 
to prevent them from occurring.  In short, Privacy by Design comes 
before-the-fact, not after. 
2. Privacy as the Default   
We can all be certain of one thing – the default rules!  Privacy by 
Design seeks to deliver the maximum degree of privacy by 
ensuring that personal data are automatically protected in any 
given IT system or business practice.  If an individual does 
nothing, their privacy still remains intact.  No action is required 
on the part of the individual to protect their privacy – it is built 
into the system, by default. 
3. Privacy Embedded into Design  
Privacy by Design is embedded into the design and architecture of 
IT systems and business practices.  It is not bolted on as an add-
on, after the fact.  The result is that privacy becomes an essential 
component of the core functionality being delivered.  Privacy is 
integral to the system, without diminishing functionality. 
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As practiced in Canada, the objective of privacy by design 
is to restore individual control over personal information 
while providing organizations a competitive advantage over 
time.  In January 2012, the Ontario Privacy Commissioner’s 
Office broadened its privacy-by-design focus to include 
autonomy interests and surveillance concerns when it hosted 
a Symposium, “Beware of ‘Surveillance by Design:’ Standing 
Up for Freedom and Privacy.”  In introducing the symposium, 
Ms. Cavoukian warned that, “Privacy is absolutely 
fundamental to freedom.  Historically, when societies have 
morphed from a free and democratic society into a 
totalitarian state, privacy has been the first thread to 
unravel.  Forfeiting privacy in favour of security, not only 
represents flawed logic, but is unnecessary—it is a false 
tradeoff.”156 
 
4. Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum   
Privacy by Design seeks to accommodate all legitimate interests 
and objectives in a positive-sum “win-win” manner, not through a 
dated, zero-sum approach, where unnecessary trade-offs are 
made.  Privacy by Design avoids the pretense of false dichotomies, 
such as privacy vs. security, demonstrating that it is possible to 
have both. 
5. End-to-End Lifecycle Protection   
Privacy by Design, having been embedded into the system prior to 
the first element of information being collected, extends 
throughout the entire lifecycle of the data involved, from start to 
finish.  This ensures that at the end of the process, all data are 
securely destroyed, in a timely fashion.  Thus, Privacy by Design 
ensures cradle to grave, lifecycle management of information, 
end-to-end. 
6. Visibility and Transparency   
Privacy by Design seeks to assure all stakeholders that whatever 
the business practice or technology involved, it is in fact, 
operating according to the stated promises and objectives, subject 
to independent verification.  Its component parts and operations 
remain visible and transparent, to users and providers alike.  
Remember, trust but verify. 
7. Respect for User Privacy   
Above all, Privacy by Design requires architects and operators to 
keep the interests of the individual uppermost by offering such 
measures as strong privacy defaults, appropriate notice, and 
empowering user-friendly options.  Keep it user-centric. 
ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES 1–2 
(2009), available at http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/23008/ 
295010.pdf. 
 156. Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, 
Introductory Address at Symposium: Beware of “Surveillance by Design:” 
Standing Up for Freedom and Privacy (Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
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The first step in privacy by design is a privacy impact 
assessment before launching a product, technology, or 
application.  In the United States, privacy assessments are 
already fairly common.  They were discussed in connection 
with the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974 and were 
eventually mandated for federal agencies by the E-
Government Act of 2002 that regulates personal information 
contained in federal government records systems.  The 2002 
E-Government Act mandates a prior Privacy Impact 
Assessment (PIA) to evaluate the privacy impact of any 
substantially revised or new federal agency Information 
Technology System.157  To the extent that the federal 
government is involved in creating or managing a 
communications network for autonomous vehicles, or collects 
data related to users of autonomous vehicles, a PIA is already 
required to assess in advance the ramifications of the system 
in terms of personal information privacy.  An effective initial 
privacy strategy for autonomous vehicles158 would require 
privacy impact assessments for all autonomous vehicle 
projects.  Moreover, the substance of these privacy 
assessments should be expanded so that the assessments 
consider impacts on autonomy privacy and surveillance 
concerns, as well as personal information privacy. 
In early 2012, the White House proposed a Consumer 
Privacy Bill of Rights, launched with a report, “Consumer 
Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global 
Digital Economy” (White House Privacy Report).159  This 
report suggests that “The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
 
http://www.realprivacy.ca/speakers. 
 157. E-Government Act, Pub. L. 107-347, Title V, § 208 (2002).  Title V is the 
Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act.  Section 208 
is entitled “Privacy Provisions” and pertains to privacy impact assessments.  As 
in Privacy by Design, privacy assessments broadly apply to federal government 
personal information systems, although there are a number of exceptions. 
 158. Applying Privacy by Design to autonomous vehicles should begin well 
before the design stage with farsighted assessment of how these vehicles will 
affect privacy over the long run.  The earlier parts of this Article suggest an 
outline for such high-level assessment.  Autonomous vehicles seem to be 
precisely the type of technologies that would benefit from careful attention to 
users’ expectations.  Privacy by Design is a particularly effective business 
practice for enterprises seeking to develop successful consumer products that 
will rely on the trust of users. 
 159. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63. 
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should be the legal baseline that governs consumer data 
privacy in the United States.”160  The White House’s 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights seems directly to apply to at 
least some types of autonomous vehicles, particularly 
interconnected autonomous vehicles that rely on 
communications networks. 
The personal data that is the focus of the White House 
Privacy Report privacy is “any data, including aggregations of 
data, which is linkable to a specific individual.  Personal data 
may include data that is linked to a specific computer or other 
device,” such as an identifier used to build a usage profile.161  
This definition appears to describe potential autonomous 
vehicle networks that would be based on the United States 
Department of Transportation’s Connected Vehicle 
Program.162  The White House Privacy Report is concerned 
about “maintaining consumer trust in networked 
technologies,”163 and seeks to work with private sector 
stakeholders to protect privacy rights of consumers, with or 
without the need for further legislation.  The specific rights 
included in the White House Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
are Individual Control, Transparency, Respect for Context, 
Security, Access and Accuracy, Focused Collection, and 
Accountability.164  Attention to these privacy rights endorsed 
by the United States President can help to optimize synergies 
between privacy and autonomous vehicles. 
In addition to the White House Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights, many similar privacy principles and even bills of 
privacy rights have been suggested in recent years.  Most 
outline what are familiarly called Fair Information Practices 
(FIPs), or Fair Information Practices Principles (FIPPs).  
Such privacy principles have been endorsed by federal 
agencies such as the Department of Commerce and the 
Federal Trade Commission.165  Many privacy principles have 
 
 160. Id. at 45. 
 161. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted).  The omitted footnote notes that the 
definition of personal data is similar to the definition of “personally identifiable 
information” used in connection with the Privacy Act of 1974. 
 162. See discussion supra Part I.A-B. 
 163. WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 63 at i. 
 164. Id. at 10. 
 165. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, supra 
note 50; FED. TRADE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 49. 
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been proposed as self-regulatory standards by industry 
groups.  Of the many industry self-regulatory initiatives, one 
of the more pertinent to autonomous vehicles is the GSMA 
Association’s166 2012 “Mobile Privacy Principles,” 
accompanied by extensive “Guidelines for Mobile Application 
Development.”167  The GSMA describes its core privacy values 
as “transparency, choice, and control—putting the user 
first.”168  The GSMA Privacy Guidelines discuss ways to 
implement a privacy-by-design proactive approach in a mobile 
environment.  They include explanations of fair information 
practices in a mobile setting, as well as examples and 
illustrative use cases.  Since autonomous vehicles will share 
many location privacy issues with mobile applications, the 
GSMA principles and guidelines illustrate a potential privacy 
strategy.  With regard to transportation technologies, a 
particularly useful privacy policy strategy for autonomous 
vehicles is the Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) 
Privacy Policies Framework (VII Privacy Framework).169  The 
VII Privacy Framework was unanimously adopted by the VII 
Coalition, a public-private group brought together by the 
United States Department of Transportation to evaluate the 
feasibility of deployment of a nationwide DSRC network for 
vehicle safety and mobility.170  Until it was disbanded in 2007, 
 
 166. GSMA (Groupe Speciale Mobile Association) refers to the powerful trade 
association (including around a thousand mobile telecommunications  
companies) that promotes the GSM mobile telephone system world-wide.  See 
Membership, GSMA, http://www.gsma.com/history/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 167. Privacy Design Guidelines of Mobile Application Development, GSMA, 
http://www.gsma.com/documents/privacy-design-guidelines-for-mobile-
application-development/20008 (last visited Apr. 22, 2012). 
 168.   Mobile Privacy Principles, GSMA, http://www.gsma.com/documents/ 
mobile-privacy-principles/20005/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).  Additional GSMA 
Mobile privacy principles include: Openness, Transparency and Notice, followed 
by Purpose and Use, User Choice and Control, Data Minimization and 
Retention, Respect User Rights, Security, Education, Children and Adolescents, 
Accountability and Enforcement.  Id. 
 169. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SUBCOMM. OF THE NAT’L VII COAL., VEHICLE 
INFRASTRUCTURE INTEGRATION: PRIVACY POLICIES FRAMEWORK, (Feb. 16, 
2007), [hereinafter VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK] available at 
http://www.its.dot.gov/research_docs/61vii_privacy_framework.htm.  The 
Framework was drafted by the Institutional Issues Subcommittee and 
unanimously adopted by the Executive Leadership Team of the VII Coalition. 
 170. VII refers to “Vehicle Infrastructure Integration,” a USDOT program 
designed to implement the FCC’s allocation in 1999 of the spectrum band at 5.9 
GHz for dedicated short-range communications (DSRC).  The application of this 
communications spectrum to vehicle-based communications for safety and 
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the VII Coalition was composed of vehicle manufacturers, as 
well as state, regional, and federal transportation regulators.  
Its goal was to facilitate development and deployment of a 
national Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) 
system for vehicles.171  The VII Privacy Framework 
represents a rare transportation-related example of proactive 
privacy policies created in advance to govern the rollout of a 
major new transportation technology.  The Framework’s 
policies continued to guide privacy protection as the VII 
system became part of the IntelliDriveSM program and later 
an aspect of the Connected Vehicle Program.172  To the extent 
that autonomous vehicles will use a national DSRC network, 
the VII Privacy Framework appears directly to apply.173 
The VII Privacy Framework was conceived as a way to 
help sync the technical design of VII’s advanced vehicle 
communications technologies with individuals’ autonomy and 
personal information privacy interests, as well as with civil 
liberties concerns about surveillance.  The goal was to assure 
that the technical design and operation of a nationwide DSRC 
network would respect reasonable privacy expectations.  
Between 2004 and 2007, a subcommittee of the VII Coalition 
painstakingly developed consensus regarding two related 
documents.  These documents first articulate privacy 
principles tailored to the particulars of the VII’s vehicle-based 
DSRC technologies and then set boundaries for legitimate 
uses of VII.  The process involved important input from a 
 
mobility purposes was launched by the United States Department of 
Transportation in 2004 as the VII Program.  Id. 
 171. DSRC is a radio network at 5.9 GHz (5.850-5.925 GHz) spectrum that 
features extremely low latency (quick on the uptake) allocated by the Federal 
Communications Commission in 1999 for vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
infrastructure communications.  Because of the quickness (low latency) of this 
frequency, DSRC is likely to be needed for V2V communications by the 
interconnected vehicle type of autonomous vehicles.  See Robert B. Kelly & 
Mark D. Johnson, Defining a Stable, Protected and Secure Spectrum 
Environment for Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1271, 1281–82, 
1289–90 (2012). 
 172. Connected Vehicle Research, supra note 8. 
 173. The VII Privacy Policies Framework defines the National VII Program 
as a broad complex including “all physical, technical and functional aspects of 
the subsystems and components used to collect, receive, transmit, store, and/or 
disseminate data and information, as well as the institutional structures and 
measures implemented in order to govern VII System users and 
administrators.”  VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 169. 
GLANCY FINAL 12/1/2012 11:17 PM 
2012] PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 1233 
variety of stakeholders, including privacy advocacy 
organizations in the development of appropriate privacy 
policies for DSRC technology.  This process was precedent 
setting in fashioning appropriately tailored privacy policies to 
fit the VII technology as that technology was being developed.  
Concentrated efforts to devise privacy policies that would 
work in the complex world of vehicle regulation, vehicle 
manufacturing, and the often-multifarious concerns of people 
who are expected to use and to rely on new transportation 
technology produced the VII Privacy Framework. 
The first part of the Framework contains the VII Privacy 
Principles that are designed to assure that, to the greatest 
extent possible, individuals who use VII-equipped vehicles 
will be able to do so privately and anonymously.  Such an 
objective is sometimes described as minimization of personal 
information.  To the extent that personal information might 
be needed for specific DSRC applications or services, the VII 
Privacy Principles emphasize the importance of fair 
information practices.  These practices include as notice and 
consent, as well as the need for careful protection of personal 
information and for limits on how long personal information 
would be retained by the network and those with access to it.  
The nine VII Privacy Principles begin with Respect for 
Privacy and Personal Information and include Information 
Purposes, Acquisition, Notice, Fair Information Use, 
Information Protection and Retention, Openness, 
Participation and Accountability.  The principles emphasize 
the importance of anonymity secured, in part, through 
technical methods designed and built into the DSRC System.  
Based on OECD privacy guidelines,174 the principles were 
presented in the familiar context of Fair Information 
Practices (FIPs) already widely used in both the public and 
private sectors in the United States.  At the same time, each 
principle was carefully crafted to apply specifically to the VII 
program’s vehicle-based DSRC communications network.  A 
similar effort will also be needed in shaping privacy 
protection for autonomous vehicles. 
 
 
 174. OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER 
FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_ 
34223_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
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The second part of the VII Privacy Framework regarding 
Privacy Limits is far more innovative and important.175  This 
aspect of the VII Privacy Framework sets boundaries on uses 
of personal information collected by or through a national 
DSRC network.  These Limits establish clear lines beyond 
which VII’s DSRC network is not to be operated or used.  The 
Limits call out particular potential uses of the VII system 
that, for policy reasons, cannot be allowed.176  Such defined 
policy boundaries are a particularly effective way to build 
consumer trust and confidence.  Being clear in advance about 
what the technology will and will not do with regard to user 
privacy is an essential trust-building strategy. 
The VII Privacy Limits are organized according to 
functional areas in which the DSRC network would operate: 
public-sector transportation, public-sector commerce and toll 
collection, public-sector regulation and commercial vehicle 
permitting, law enforcement/investigation, public security 
surveillance, private-sector commerce, and private-sector 
transportation.  This functional organization adapts the 
Limits to the practical contexts of particular DSRC vehicle 
technology applications.  The Limits emphasize vehicle 
owners’ rights to remain anonymous through the technical 
design of the DSRC network, as well as through operational 
controls over the National VII Program.  Voluntary individual 
user consent and choice set important boundaries with regard 
to use of personal information derived from the DSRC 
network.  For example, the Limits provide that, except for 
specific public sector regulation and commercial vehicle 
permitting applications in which personal information is 
required by law, individuals using DSRC-equipped vehicles 
should not be required to supply personal information. 
The VII Privacy Policies Framework was developed as a 
foundation.  More detailed privacy guidance and further 
legislative and regulatory measures were expected to carry 
out the fundamental privacy protections and expectations 
 
 175. VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 169 (referring to the section 
entitled, Vehicle Infrastructure Integration Privacy Limits on Uses of Personal 
Information). 
 176. For example, Limit 4 provides that “the National VII Program shall not 
be used by law enforcement for: recording real-time video or voice of vehicle 
occupants, or . . . off-board control of vehicle driving or maneuvering functions.”  
VII PRIVACY FRAMEWORK, supra note 169. 
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outlined in the Framework.  In considering privacy protection 
for autonomous vehicles, a similar deliberative process of 
consensus building among stakeholders, including privacy 
advocacy groups would be wise.  A privacy policy framework 
similarly structured in two parts—one containing principles 
and the other providing limits to technological applications—
provides a useful model for creating an autonomous vehicles 
privacy policies framework. 
So far, there are neither technical nor legal standards 
specifically addressed to autonomous vehicles.  In addition to 
high-level, privacy-by-design measures, privacy standards 
need to be included among the legal and technical 
requirements for autonomous vehicles.  Technical criteria 
regarding such matters as anonymization of personal 
information generated by and gathered from autonomous 
vehicles, as well as data encryption standards, need to be 
adopted for all autonomous vehicles before they are launched 
into the consumer market.  The Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE) On-Road Autonomous Vehicle Standards 
Committee (part of the Vehicle Engineering Systems Group of 
the Motor Vehicle Council) embarked on standard setting for 
“On-Road Autonomous Vehicles” in 2012.177  Standards for 
autonomous vehicles are being called for by both industry and 
legislators.178 Privacy requirements should be among these 
standards. 
Legislation is also likely to affect interactions between 
privacy and autonomous vehicles.  Privacy issues related to a 
person’s physical location (often called “location privacy”) 
have become highly visible.  In response, legislation 
governing that aspect of autonomous vehicles has already 
been introduced.  Legislation pending before the 112th 
Congress in 2012 includes both Senator Franken’s “Location 
Privacy Protection Act” (S. 1223) and the “Geolocation 
Privacy and Surveillance Act” (H.R. 2168 and S. 1212) as well 
as Senator Leahy’s “Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
Amendments Act of 2011” (S. 1011), of which Section 5 
 
 177. See On-Road Autonomous Vehicle Standards Committee, supra note 65. 
 178. For example, California State Senator Alex Padilla has introduced SB 
1298 to allow autonomous vehicles to be licenseable in California.  Chuck 
Squatriglia, California Lawmaker Wants Rules for Robo-Cars, Autopia Blog, 
WIRED (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:10 PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/02/padilla-
robo-cars-sb-1298. 
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focuses on “Location Information Privacy.”  In the Executive 
Branch, the White House has suggested legislative enactment 
of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, discussed above, that 
directly addresses networks and location information both of 
which are likely to be features of autonomous vehicles.179 
Proposed legislation likely to affect autonomous vehicles 
contains a variety of initiatives.  These legislative proposals 
are significant because they all call for protection of location 
privacy rights of consumers, including those who may become 
users of autonomous vehicles.  For example, Senator 
Franken’s proposed legislation, S. 1223, expressly applies to 
communications devices, “including but not limited to, a 
vehicle the individual drives.”180  All of the various legislative 
proposals regarding location privacy place privacy protection 
responsibilities on technology providers to assure that 
potential users retain control over collection of personal 
location information and affirmatively and knowingly consent 
before users’ personal location information is collected or 
used.  In the future, federal legislation may also specifically 
regulate autonomous vehicles on a national basis.  If so, 
requirements for privacy protections, as well as privacy 
impact analyses and regular privacy audits, should be 
included, as well as limits prohibiting use of autonomous 
vehicles for surveillance purposes. 
As a regulatory matter, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) has indicated that the 
agency understands the importance of privacy, particularly 
location privacy, with regard to regulating autonomous 
vehicles.181  Regulatory measures either in the form of 
autonomous vehicle safety standards related to consumer 
acceptance or in response to legislation regarding 
autonomous vehicles would wisely include specific 
requirements for protection of autonomous vehicle users’ 
privacy.  Since NHTSA considers privacy protection to be an 
important aspect of consumer acceptance of autonomous 
vehicles,182 safety rules regarding autonomous vehicles are 
should recognize the need not only for technical standards, 
 
 179. See WHITE HOUSE PRIVACY REPORT,  supra note 63. 
 180. Location Privacy Protection Act, S. 1223, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011). 
 181. See Wood et al., supra note 8, at 1446, 1461–63, 1466–67. 
 182. Id. 
GLANCY FINAL 12/1/2012 11:17 PM 
2012] PRIVACY IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 1237 
but also for privacy policies as well. 
Other federal agencies, including both the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Commerce, have 
suggested the need for particular measures to protect location 
information in the context of Internet browsing and mobile 
devices.  The Federal Trade Commission Report, “Protecting 
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” released in 
March 2012, expresses specific concern about location-based 
mobile services.183  Since that time, FTC has intensified its 
scrutiny of both on-line Internet tracking and on-the-road 
location tracking.184  Concerns about Internet tracking related 
to online behavioral advertising that records people’s 
movements on the Internet are in some ways similar to 
concerns about tracking people in real space, including people 
using autonomous vehicles.  In both contexts, user choice and 
consent are as important as they are difficult to obtain and to 
maintain.  Both on the road and on line, “Do Not Track” 
should mean, “when the consumer so chooses, Do Not 
Collect.”185 
Many different privacy-enhancing technologies, such as 
encryption and anonymization, are available to privacy-
minded autonomous vehicle developers.  Autonomous vehicles 
have the potential to apply intelligent systems to make 
protection of privacy interests automatic.  For example, 
privacy limits (such as transmitting or retaining only 
anonymous information, or automatic encryption of all 
personal information) could be built into an autonomous 
vehicle’s technology to prevent privacy problems from arising.  
Such measures would also reassure autonomous vehicle 
users, who might otherwise be reluctant to trust autonomous 
vehicles because of privacy concerns.  Autonomous vehicles 
also could be technically prevented from collecting, storing, or 
transmitting specific information related to a person, such as 
the person’s location or home address.  In other words, the 
intelligence that drives an autonomous vehicle should be 
smart enough to make privacy protection part of the 
 
 183. See FED. TRADE COMM’N REPORT, supra note 49. 
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ARE DISAPPOINTING (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/02/120216 
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architecture of autonomous vehicles. 
An autonomous vehicle can be designed to minimize 
personal information that it generates, collects, or retains.  
Such technical measures as encryption and access controls 
can also help prevent any personal information that is 
collected by an autonomous vehicle from becoming available 
to others.  If personal information is necessary to perform a 
particular function (such as toll payment), that personal 
information should be automatically destroyed when that 
transitory purpose (paying the toll) has been accomplished.186  
Autonomous vehicles can also be built to prevent external 
control from taking over an autonomous vehicle from its user.  
Measures that permit a user to retain or to regain control 
over the vehicle would also facilitate autonomy privacy 
interests of prospective users of autonomous vehicles.187 
Particular types of autonomous vehicles will likely 
require attention to different types of privacy enhancing 
technologies.  For example, an interconnected autonomous 
vehicle will likely transmit significant amounts of 
information, potentially including personal information.  That 
personal information needs to be rendered anonymous, as 
well as encrypted, before it is transmitted into the network.  
Moreover, access to such a network needs to be secured 
through such controls as changing encryption keys and 
identifiers.  The selfcontained type of autonomous vehicle will 
also require strict limits on retaining personal information 
and efforts to protect the anonymity of users.  Any recorded 
personal information would also need to be strongly 
encrypted, protected by access authentication and subject to 
tough physical security.   
Preventing use of both types of autonomous vehicles from 
becoming surveillance tools will require political commitment 
as well as legal enforcement of privacy norms protecting 
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individuals from potentially overbearing social and 
governmental systems.  Most important, these privacy issues 
must be systematically addressed in advance—before 
autonomous vehicles become consumer products. 
CONCLUSION 
Careful attention both to privacy and to the potential of 
autonomous vehicles to enhance safety and mobility can 
generate favorable synergies.  Privacy concerns will influence 
how autonomous vehicles are configured, just as individual 
privacy and freedom will be affected by the ways in which 
autonomous vehicles are designed and operated.  Infusing 
privacy into these powerful disruptive technologies will 
present many challenges, none of them insurmountable.  In 
the end, the future success of autonomous vehicles will 
depend in part on how well privacy interests and autonomous 
vehicles can work together.  This Article has discussed some 
ways to make that happen.  Now, before consumer versions 
are offered to the public, autonomous vehicles have a unique 
opportunity to design privacy into these new modes of 
personal mobility.  After all, autonomous vehicles that 
deserve the trust and confidence of people who will decide 
whether or not to use them is a goal shared by both 
autonomous vehicle developers and those concerned about 
personal privacy. 
 
